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INTRODUCTION

What is persuasive? This question is at the heart of lawyering and legal writing.
The art of persuasion requires empathy as well as a deep understanding of human psychology and the complex emotional and intellectual processes that result in perception and attitude change. Measuring persuasiveness is exceedingly difficult, yet this endeavor continues to preoccupy a
number of disciplines, including philosophy, communications, psychology,
and rhetoric. On some level, what tactics persuade is more than a little mysterious and cannot be precisely quantified or definitively articulated. What
is persuasive to one may be neutral to another and even repellent to a third.
Nevertheless, there are clues about how human beings respond to persuasive
tactics, and lawyers should be taking greater advantage of the information.
The purpose of this Article is to enhance knowledge of effective persuasive legal writing by taking the exploration in a somewhat different direction from the traditional approaches. This Article argues that it is critical
for persuasive writers to study the existing social-science data about human
decisionmaking.1 Trial lawyers have taken serious steps to study and probe
social science for ideas about how to persuade (or pick) juries.2 Yet, decades after Jerome Frank reminded us that judges, like juries, are human,
appellate lawyers have been slow to follow their trial brethren in the pursuit
of scientific data about what persuades people.3
Instead, the study of persuasive writing has been dominated by a kind
of "armchair psychology"-a set of conventions and practices, handed
down from lawyer to lawyer, developed largely from instinct and speculation.4 By and large, the information available to students and lawyers about

1. See Michael J. Saks, Turning Practiceinto Progress:Better Lawyering Through
Experimentation, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 801, 802-03 (1991) (making a parallel argument
for trial practitioners).
2. See, e.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell et al., Primacy, Recency, Ethos and Pathos:
Integrating Principles of Communication into the Direct Examination, 76 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 423 (2001); John B. Mitchell, Why Should the Prosecutor Get the Last Word?, 27 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 139 (2000); Saks, supranote 1, at 802-03 (urging trial lawyers to treat persuasion
as an empirical question).
3. Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (1931). There are
some notable recent exceptions. For example, Michael Smith provides evidentiary support
from cognitive psychology, literary theory, and classical rhetoric for the persuasive strategies
outlined in his text, Advanced Legal Writing: Theories and Strategies in Persuasive Writing.
But the concept of integrating techniques gleaned from social science into legal writing is
relatively new and largely unexplored.
4. See Kathryn M. Stanchi, Moving Beyond Instinct: Persuasion in the Era of
ProfessionalLegal Writing, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 935 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL R.
SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING
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persuasive legal writing reproduces these conventions and practices without
analysis or critique, and without taking stock of the growing body of research from other disciplines that would provide some evidence about
whether the conventional wisdom is an accurate account of human decisionmaking.
I. STUDYING PERSUASION IN OTHER FIELDS TO EXPAND KNOWLEDGE
ABOUT PERSUASION IN LAW

There are several reasons why persuasive legal writers need information beyond the conventional wisdom and platitudes that have dominated
the study of legal advocacy writing. First, now that there is social-science
data about human responses to persuasive tactics, lawyers have an obligation to use it to test and reexamine the validity of the conventional wisdom.
There is nothing wrong with instinct, unless, of course, it is wrong.' The
social-science data may suggest that the conventional wisdom is an accurate
assessment of human decisionmaking, or it may suggest that the conventional wisdom is outdated, or wrong. Either way, lawyers would be more
effective writers if they knew more about the science of persuasion.
Even if the conventional wisdom is fully supported by research into
human behavior, it is worth learning about this research to acquire a richer
understanding of why and when certain strategies do or do not work. Without information about the "why" and the "when," advocates run the risk of
using certain rhetorical strategies slavishly or inappropriately. Advocacy is
most effective when the lawyer has the tools to make deliberate, conscious
decisions about the persuasive device to employ and how and when to employ it. This requires knowing why a particular tactic works, under what
circumstances it worked, and when it fails. Thus, the second reason to
study the social-science data about persuasion is to enhance and deepen
lawyers' understanding of persuasion, to help them make better, more effective choices about the techniques they use in their persuasive writing.
Finally, there is benefit to simply identifying and cataloging persuav€iP tprlhninii,
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use in legal documents permits other lawyers to see and understand a wider
array of techniques. This expands the complement of tools available to advocates, which will make advocacy writing more versatile and interesting,
as well as more effective.
That said, there are caveats to the exploration of persuasion in other
disciplines. Much of the available information about human decisionmaking processes does not study legal decisionmaking or target lawyers or
(2002); Saks, supra note 1, at 802-03 (arguing trial lawyers learn persuasion based on advice
from others and trial and error).
5. See Saks, supra note 1, at 803-04.
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judges as message recipients. Moreover, there is little explicit discussion of
law or legal writing; rather, I have taken the data and the explanations and
extrapolated from them to explain, support, or illuminate something about
various persuasive legal writing techniques. Therefore, my application of
these data to the legal writing context offers few bright-line rules for the
advocate.
In this context, extrapolation is further muddied by the unique qualities of legal reasoning, some of which may cause the legal audience to react
differently from non-lawyers to certain persuasive techniques. The conventional wisdom of persuasive legal writing has been taught and used by generations of lawyers. As a result, the legal audience might expect and be
comfortable with certain traditional techniques.6 This might suggest that the
legal audience is more likely to be persuaded by conventional techniques
over persuasive techniques that depart from the conventional wisdom, however effectively they may influence the lay audience.
However, even with these caveats, studying data about persuasion
from other disciplines is a useful exercise. These qualifications simply suggest that lawyers should use the information about persuasion wisely and
carefully. Even though more and diverse data about persuasion does not
necessarily make decisions about persuasive legal writing easy or clear, it
permits better informed and more conscious argument drafting, which can
only improve the power of advocacy writing.
The study of persuasion and human decisionmaking spans a number of
fields, including communications, philosophy, rhetoric, and social psychology.7 The sheer number of experiments and theories, as well as the data
collected, is vast. This Article examines the data and theories underlying
two concepts: sequential request strategies and involvement. First, the Article discusses how the data and theories of social science might inform persuasive legal writing, and looks at examples to demonstrate and explain the
application of the data and theories to law. Part II explores how the data
6. See, e.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL
ARGUMENT 243-5 5 (rev. 1st ed. 1996) (arguing appellate persuasion differs from persuasion
in other arenas, and judges may react unfavorably to unconventional arguments). Indeed, a
social-science theory supports this phenomenon: Language Expectancy Theory posits people
"develop cultural and sociological expectations about language behaviors that subsequently
affect their acceptance or rejection of persuasive messages." Michael Burgoon et al., Language Expectancy Theory, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND

PRACTICE 117, 121 (2002).
7.
See, e.g., THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002) (multi-disciplinary); SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY: A HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES (E. Tory Higgins & Arie W. Kruglanski
eds., 1996) (social psychology); G. RAY FUNKHOUSER, THE POWER OF PERSUASION: A GUIDE
TO MOVING AHEAD IN BUSINESS AND LIFE (1986) (business); FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS

AND CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS (1996) (interdisciplinary).
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and theory of sequential request strategies can inform the structure and order of legal arguments. It looks at two different strategies, one called "foot
in the door" and the other called "door in the face." Part III investigates
audience motivation and involvement.
II. SEQUENTIAL REQUEST STRATEGIES AND THE CHAINING OF LEGAL
ARGUMENTS

Sequential request strategies test how message recipients react to a series of persuasive messages that are presented in a certain order.8 In the two
most well-known sequential request strategies, the "critical" request (the
one the persuader is most interested in the recipient's reaction to) follows
some other request. 9 The idea is to determine whether it is possible to influence the recipient's decision about the critical request by "priming" the recipient with a certain kind of prior request.
Persuasive legal writers may not be familiar with the psychological
term "priming," but much of the conventional wisdom of legal writing incorporates the concept. Persuasive writers are told to begin their briefs with
the strongest arguments, to lead paragraphs with strong thesis sentences,
and to precede legal text and rules with strong argumentative statements."0
In the most artful briefs, the advocate has devised an organization that carefully primes the reader by leading her, step-by-step, toward acceptance of
the final thesis that is the winning proposition for the advocate."
This organizational priming means that the advocate has consciously
constructed a series of overlapping propositions together in a chain, so that
the acceptance of one proposition leads inexorably to the next. The most
interesting and effective argument chains link points or premises that the
reader might not have necessarily connected together.12 In legal writing,
8.
9.
10.

DANIEL O'KEEFE, PERSUASION: THEORY AND RESEARCH

169 (1990).

Id.
See, e.g.,

ALDISERT, supra note 6, at 211; MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL
GUIDE To APPELLATE ADVOCACY 76-77, 156((2002).
11.
See VAN EEMEREN ET AL., supra note 7, at 105-17 (discussing argument by

association model developed by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca). The process of constructing argument chains in legal writing has been likened to the process of "[f]orward chaining"
in artificial intelligence, in which a series of inferences is connected "so that the conclusion
of one inference also functions as a premise in the next one." Douglas N. Walton, A Pragmatic Model of Legal Disputation,73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 711, 724-25 (1998).

12. One commentator has suggested a modification of the "chain" metaphor, arguing that the best legal arguments are constructed as cables of connected and intertwining
threads, so that unlike the "chain [which] is no stronger than its weakest link," the argument
is solid throughout its length. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 351 (1990). True enough, but

for this Article, the chain metaphor is more apt because the focus is on the skeleton of the
argument (the series of links), as opposed to the body of evidence supporting the links. For
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chaining is not only a way of structuring an argument but also of moving
the argument forward. A useful metaphor for this tactic is the series of steps
up to the high diving board: as the persuader gets the target up each step
closer to the edge of the board, it becomes that much easier to decide to
jump and that much harder to decide to go back down. 3
Chaining is a successful persuasive tactic in part because of the nature
of arguments. Arguments are "goal-directed" conversations that revolve
around an issue about which the parties have conflicting opinions. 4 Each
party is trying to move the conversation toward acceptance of her opinion,
using an array of persuasive strategies, sometimes called "moves." An argument strategy or "move" is successful if it "extrapolates forward" toward
the goal of the conversation. 5 A move that "extrapolates forward" helps
resolve the conflict by showing one or the other proposition to be more or
less likely.16 Put another way, the goal of persuasion is to move the target
audience forward along the "action decision sequence" away from the human propensity for inaction or habitual action and toward the advocate's
desired action. 7 This decisional momentum is one of the primary purposes
of chaining.
In persuasive legal writing, argument chaining is a longstanding and
fairly typical strategy, though not all lawyers use it well. The strategy harkens back to the syllogism, the quintessential form of deductive reasoning in
classical rhetoric.' 8 Unlike the classical syllogism, however, the forward
chain in legal writing almost always has points of weak connection between
the premises and conclusion. The artful advocate can make the chain look
ironclad, even when it is not.

my purposes, the important point is that the advocate is attempting to link together-as
firmly as possible-a number of premises that the reader might not previously have linked
together. The question is whether there is any information about how to construct the skeleton or basic links of the chain. This is a question about the structure and order of arguments,
separate from the question of evidence. Moreover, even with the cable metaphor, the cable
will be weaker in certain areas, because some arguments will have fewer threads than others.
13. FUNKHOUSER, supranote 7, at 114.
14. Walton, supra note 11, at 724.
15. Id.; see also FUNKHOUSER, supra note 7, at 70-72.
16. Walton, supra note 11, at 724.
17. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 7, at 70-72. The action decision sequence is a model
of human decisionmaking that posits that human beings all take a series of predictable sequential steps before making any decision. The sequence begins with some stimulus to action, at which point the target must decide whether to take any action (or make any decision),
and, after a series of sequential steps, ends with the target deciding whether to do what the
persuader wants. Id.
18. See Kristen K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to
Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 VT. L. REv. 483, 492-93 (2003). In its simplest form, the
syllogism has a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. Id.
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In contrast to the formally valid syllogism, the forward chain in legal
writing is usually a form of "quasi-logical argumentation," in which the
advocate presents elements or premises in such a way as to give the target
audience the impression that the elements or premises are logically connected.19 In quasi-logical argumentation, the advocate creates the illusion
that the link between the premises and ultimate conclusion is as unassailable
as a formal syllogism, but the logic may not actually be provably valid in
the formal sense.2" Rather, the advocate seeks to influence the audience by
making the argument look like a mathematical or logical proof.21 To make
the chain appear strong and solid, advocates manipulate language to make
look homogenous, congruent, and unambiguous to the audithe premises
22
ence.
A. The First Link: How to Start an Argument
Chaining arguments is a kind of sequential request strategy. As with
any sequential request strategy, a key decision is how to begin the forward
chain-with what premise(s) should the writer "prime" the audience to influence acceptance of the "critical" request. The entire chain, and therefore
the structure of the argument, will be determined by the premises that begin
it. In persuasive legal writing, the conventional wisdom often suggests that
the advocate begin the chain with relatively uncontroversial premises, on
the theory that if the reader agrees with the first few premises, she is more
likely to accept the ultimate thesis.23 Using the diving board metaphor, this
tactic begins by attempting to convince the message recipient to get on the
first step of the high dive.
Sometimes the argument chain will be preceded by the ultimate conclusion-the assertion, however controversial or bold, that the advocate is
trying to get the court to accept. This is typical of legal reasoning, and
19.

VAN EEMEREN ET AL.,

supra note 7, at 107. Argumentation theorist Stephen

does not accurately portray the way people
Toulmin has argued
the formal
syllogism
...
tuailythattink
pl
......
j-.................-----"---....
casial sylogisrnin tavor ofaoi
actually tnk. Toulmin's "pcop's loglc rects
informal approach to logic. See Michael Burgoon & Erwin P. Bettinghaus, PersuasiveMessage Strategies,in PERSUASION: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 141, 147 (Michael E. Roloff & Gerald R. Miller eds., 1980); see also Paul T. Wangerin, MultiDisciplinaryAnalysis of the Structure of PersuasiveArguments, 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y

195, 202 (1993).
20.

VAN EEMEREN ET AL., supra note 7, at 107; see also Robbins, supra note 18, at

496 (conceding the requirements of formal logic cannot be strictly applied to most legal
argumentation because, in law, most premises are not "indisputably true").
21.

VAN EEMEREN ET AL., supranote 7, at 107.

22. Id. at 108.
23. See Robbins, supra note 18, at 493 (noting valid syllogisms have seemingly
"ironclad" quality such that if you agree with the premises, you cannot dispute the conclusion).
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represents a form of "anti-climax" order.24 Preceding the chain with the
conclusion, as opposed to starting with a less controversial premise, is a
common approach in legal writing. In the high-dive metaphor, this tactic
would begin by urging the message recipient to jump off the high dive, and
would follow with an argument chain detailing why this is a good idea.
Since the conclusion is often followed by argument chains that begin with a
less controversial premise (at some point the persuader must try to convince
the message recipient to get on that first step), the two tactics are less dissimilar than they may first appear.
The focus here is less on whether to begin with the conclusion or not,
but in what way to begin the chain of reasons supporting the conclusion. In
many cases, the persuader will have a choice among arguments, some of
which may be "safe"-i.e., likely acceptable-and those that may be riskier.
The theories about human decisionmaking that follow tell the persuader a
bit about how the message recipient might react to the different approaches.
An understanding of these theories gives the legal advocate a deeper knowledge with which to make strategic decisions about the construction of the
chains.
1. Start With PremisesLikely to Be Accepted: "Foot in the Door"
Empirical research on human behavior and decisionmaking provides
some evidence that argument chains are more likely to persuade readers if
the first links of the chain are well-settled or widely accepted premises. In
one experiment, researchers tested the so-called "foot in the door" strategy
by studying how test targets reacted to a large and difficult request if the
targets had previously agreed to perform a small and easy request." The
foot-in-the-door strategy posits that "a powerful predictor of future compliance is past compliance." 6 The results demonstrated that people are more
likely to accede to large requests if they had previously agreed to smaller
ones, even if there is a significant time delay, and even if there is no obvious
relationship between the two demands.27 It is almost a "bobble-head" ef24.

See, e.g., RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING:

STRUCTURE, STRATEGY AND STYLE 100-04 (5th ed. 2005); LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL
WRITING AND ANALYSIS 90-91 (2003); see also O'KEEFE, supra note 8, at 159. Most studies
reveal organization by climax or anti-climax order does not make a difference in persuasive
effect. Id.
25. O'KEEFE, supra note 8, at 169; see also Kelton V. L. Rhoads & Robert Cialdini,
The Business of Influence: Principles that Lead to Success in Commercial Settings, in THE
PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 513, 525-26 (James
Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002); Burgoon & Bettinghaus, supra note 19, at 155-57.
26. Burgoon & Bettinghaus, supra note 19, at 155.
27. O'KEEFE, supra note 8, at 169-70. For example, people were more willing to
put a big sign on their lawn that advocated safe driving if they had previously signed a peti-
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fect: once the message recipient starts nodding "yes," it is likely that she
will continue to nod "yes." The foot-in-the-door response is so strong that it
creates a "halo effect": when people agreed to the initial commitment, future agreement was likely even for requests that were only remotely related
to the initial one.28
Researchers attribute the success of foot-in-the-door to a change in
self-perception that occurs when people perform-or agree to perform-the
initial request. 29 That is, once a person accedes to the initial request, she
begins to see herself differently; her attitude changes and in her own mind
she becomes the sort of person who agrees to certain kinds of requests.3
This is a fairly common psychological observation about human beings:
they derive their current attitudes and decisions from observing their own
past behavior.3 People asked to make a decision do a "self-observation"
and then use their own past behavior as a way of gauging their attitudes and
beliefs. They then use what they have observed about their belief system to
reach a decision about a current problem. In other words, much like legal
reasoning, people have a cache of personal decisional "precedent" which
they use to decide current problems.
On the simplest level, for example, if a person's self-assessment reveals her to be someone who has cared for stray cats in the past, she will see
herself as someone who is compassionate toward homeless animals, and she
will be likely to accede if someone asks her to take a stray cat into her
home. However, the self-observation process is rarely this concrete and
rigid; rather, again, as in legal reasoning, the precedent is susceptible to
extrapolation and generalizing. So, if the person determines that she cares
for stray cats, not only will she be likely to take in a stray cat, but may also
see herself generally as a compassionate person, and be more likely to sign
a petition to protect wetland ecosystems, or protest a bear hunt, or even attend an anti-war demonstration.
The persuader who uses the foot-in-the-door technique manipulates
the "self-observation" process of the message recipient. The persuader influences the recipient's assessment of her belief system by purposefully
addlng
-a
prtcular decision t, the cache thant th.e recipient will use to determine her beliefs and make the future decision. Foot-in-the-door is a way of
tion to "keep California beautiful." Id. It did not matter if the request was made by the same
person or a different person, or if there was a significant time delay between the small and
large request. Id.
28. Rhoads & Cialdini, supra note 25, at 526.
29. Id.; O'KEEFE, supranote 8, at 170-71.
30. Burgoon & Bettinghaus, supra note 19, at 156.
31. Id.; O'KEEFE, supra note 8, at 75; Shelly Chaiken, Wendy Wood, & Alice H.
Eagley, Principles of Persuasion, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: A HANDBOOK OF BASIC
PRINCIPLES 705-06 (E. Tory Higgins & Arie W. Kruglanski eds., 1996) [hereinafter Chaiken,

Wood].
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creating precedent for a message recipient to use in deciding a problem. So,
in the prior example, if the persuader can convince the recipient to donate to
a cat shelter, the persuader is in a better position to convince the recipient to
take in the stray cat, or oppose the bear hunt. By carefully choosing that
first request, the persuader can alter the course of the recipient's decisionmaking.
The success of foot-in-the-door depends not only on the process of
human decisionmaking, but also on certain aspects of human nature. Footin-the-door is particularly effective in people who have a strong preference
for consistency in behavior. 2 But, overall, most people tend to seek "selfconsistency," which is why foot-in-the-door has such broad success as a
compliance strategy. People tend to make decisions that decrease feelings
of inconsistency and increase feelings of consistency when compared with
their prior behaviors.33 So, when they engage in the decisionmaking process, they are scanning their prior decisions so they can make consistent future decisions. If they make a decision that seems inconsistent with prior
behavior or with their perception of their belief system, they experience
"cognitive dissonance" and will resolve that dissonance by changing their
belief system to conform to the decision made, or changing their decision.34
Foot-in-the-door works when the persuader creates a scenario that leads the
recipient to make a certain decision that is consistent with the decision the
persuader ultimately wants from the recipient.
The second reason for the consistent success of foot-in-the-door is that
people seek "self-affirmation." A person will therefore seek to make a decision that confirms her belief that she is a person of integrity and morality.35
People have attitudes or beliefs in part to serve their self-image. Thus, attitudes are said to be ego-defensive; that is, people will not espouse attitudes
or beliefs that force them to admit negative information about themselves.36
Attitudes are also "value-expressive," as they allow us to present ourselves
as having certain core traits such as competence, knowledge, and sensitivity.37 People will make decisions that protect and affirm their positive images of themselves. The foot-in-the-door strategy taps into the self-image
32. Rhoads & Cialdini, supra note 25, at 526. The fact that foot-in-the-door does
not influence young children is said to demonstrate the importance of a desire for behavioral
consistency to the success of the strategy.
33. Eddie Harmon-Jones, A Cognitive Dissonance Theory Perspective on Persuasion, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 99, 102
(James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002); KATHLEEN KELLEY REARDON, PERSUASION:
THEORY AND CONTEXT 68-69 (1981).
34. See Harmon-Jones, supra note 33, at 102; Chaiken, Wood, supra note 31, at
704-05.
35. See Harmon-Jones, supra note 33, at 102-03.
36. See REARDON, supra note 33, at 67.
37. Id.
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part of human decisionmaking because the recipient's agreement to the first
request leads her to a certain generalization about what kind of person she
is. The recipient will then make future decisions in a way that affirms this
generalization.
What does all of this have to do with persuasive legal writing? On the
most concrete level, advocates can interpret the foot-in-the-door data to
strongly suggest that argument chains should begin with premises that the
reader will readily accept. In part, a successful argument chain breaks down
the ultimate thesis of the argument into a series of linked premises that lead
to the thesis. Foot-in-the-door suggests that the audience is more likely to
accept the ultimate thesis if the earlier premises leading up to it are phrased
in a way that induces compliance in the reader. The persuasive writer wants
to create an argument chain that leads the judge to start nodding "yes" to her
arguments.
Most judges also share the common human desire to affirm their positive self-image. They want to see themselves as fair, compassionate, logical, and moral people.3" A well-constructed argument chain can create the
impression that the ultimate decision is the fairest, most compassionate,
most logical, and so on. This is also a confirmation of the common strategy
in which the advocate struggles for the high moral or policy ground, attempting to convince the judge that a decision for the advocate's client is
the fairest, most compassionate decision.
But, on a theoretical level, the premise underlying the foot-in-the-door
technique gives persuasive writers much information about how to sway
judges.
The knowledge that most human beings perform a "selfobservation" of past behavior to determine their beliefs and then will use
those beliefs to make the current decision is especially useful. The strong
pull toward self-consistency is also useful information. In law, there is an
even greater value placed on consistency and order. This means that even
though judges are skeptical readers trained to ferret out any dubious premises or tenuous connections, they are susceptible to a strong human drive to
behave consistently with their own prior decisions. Of course, lawyers already know that judges will seek to make future decisions that are consistent with prior ones. Indeed, the whole foundation of the legal decisionmaking process-stare decisis-presupposes a high level of consistency in
decisionmaking. This is not necessarily news to the persuasive writer,
38. See RONALD WAICUKAUSKI, PAUL MARK SANDLER & JOANNE Epps, THE
WINNING ARGUMENT 86-87 (2001) (stating that judges are human and influenced by emotions, such as sympathy); Louis J. SIRIcO, JR. & NANCY L. SCHULTZ, PERSUASIVE WRITING
FOR LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 16 (2d ed. 2001) (judges moved by "appeals to

their desire to do the right thing in a larger, social policy kind of way"); ROBIN WELLFORD,
LEGAL REASONING, WRITING AND PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT 318 (2002) (stating that "judges
strive to 'do the right thing"').
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though it is certainly helpful to have empirical confirmation of the conventional wisdom.
However, the newer and more powerful implication of foot-in-thedoor for persuasive writers is the knowledge that the "self-observation"
process of message recipients does not always involve a "set" cache of beliefs and decisions; rather, the process is susceptible to influence by the advocate. The advocate can organize her argument in such a way as to add to
the cache of prior decisions that the reader will use to perform her selfobservation. In that way, the advocate can influence the message recipient's
determination-or perception-of the beliefs that will drive the ultimate
decision. By crafting argument chains that add to the body of prior decisions that the reader will use to determine "what kind of person" she is, the
advocate can demonstrate to the reader that she is the "kind of person" who
agrees with the advocate's ultimate position. The impact on the reader's
decisionmaking process can be especially significant when the argument
chain leads with premises that the reader is likely to accept, but that the
reader may not have independently connected to the advocate's thesis.
Foot-in-the-door also has the advantage of subtlety. It affects the
reader's desire for consistency and self-affirmation, but does so in a somewhat indirect and non-obvious way. Affecting the "self-observation" process of the reader preserves the reader's impression that she has independently arrived at the decision, when in fact the decision has been influenced
by the advocate. Preserving the appearance of audience autonomy lessens
the likelihood that the audience will feel coerced and angry, feelings which
can lead to the so-called "boomerang effect" in which the message recipient
responds to the persuasive message by rejecting it or making a decision
opposite to the one advocated.39
This is not to say that a well-crafted argument chain will convince a
reader that she is a completely different "kind of person," or that it effectively convinces judges to make decisions they are otherwise firmly
against.4" But, for example, in close cases where judges do not have a firm
predisposition, or where the argument chain demonstrates non-obvious links
between prior favorable decisions or premises and the decision sought, footin-the-door suggests that the momentum of agreement is difficult to resist.

39. Michael Burgoon et al., Revisiting the Theory of Psychological Reactance:
Communicating Threats to Attitudinal Freedom, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 213, 215-16 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds.,
2002).
40. There are a number of studies, in fact, that document the relative ineffectiveness
of persuasive strategies when the level of discrepancy between the decision sought by the
persuasive message and the message recipient's position is very large. See O'KEEFE, supra
note 8, at 162.
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The momentum created by a series of agreeable premises is important
in the creation of legal argument chains because the chains are rarely ironclad or formally valid. 4' The "halo" effect of the foot-in-the-door strategy
that occurs because people tend to generalize about their beliefs from prior
decisions implies that the persuasive writer has some flexibility in crafting a
chain. The advocate is not necessarily bound rigidly to premises with obvious connections; though, of course, the degree to which the argument chain
deviates from acceptable norms correlates to the risk that the reader will
reject one or more of its premises, destroying the foot-in-the-door effect.42
The foot-in-the-door research suggests a number of strategies for argument chaining. First, the initial request must be attractive and induce
compliance, but it also must be "of sufficient magnitude" to trigger the selfscanning process.43 The request must "prompt" the message recipient to
"infer attitudes from behaviors." 44 So, the first few links in the argument
chain must be carefully chosen to be small enough to ensure a positive reaction from the legal audience, but large enough to trigger a self-consistency
and self-affirmation process. Moreover, in terms of stare decisis and choice
of authority, foot-in-the-door suggests that prior decisions by the same
judge will be especially persuasive, and can be forged into the chain to
stimulate an even stronger self-consistency reaction. However, this is not
necessary to the principle; essentially, the chaining process works by formulating legal arguments with which the judge will agree at the time she reads
the brief, creating a flow of agreement leading to the advocated premise.
2. Argument Chains that "Work on" the "Footin the Door" Principle
The vast majority of well-written, persuasive appellate briefs contain
multiple examples of argument chains that begin with a series of linked
premises that the court is likely to accept and that lead the court to agree
with the more controversial premise-the critical request. In Davis v. Monroe County Boardof Education,45 for example, the petitioner's brief used a
number of argument chains that began with widely accepted premises that
set the reader on the path to acceptance of the advocate's ultimate the.iv 46
In two basic argument chains designed to convince the Supreme Court that
41. See Robbins, supranote 18, at 496; see also VAN EEMEREN ET AL., supranote 7,
at 107-08, 132-34.
42.

See TRUDY GOVIER, A PRACTICAL STUDY OF ARGUMENT 53 (1985) (stating per-

suasive arguments must be composed of premises that are acceptable and connected to the
conclusion).
43. Burgoon & Bettinghaus, supra note 19, at 158.
44. Id. at 159.
45. 525 U.S. 1065 (1999).
46. See Brief of Petitioner, Davis, 525 U.S. 1065 (No. 97-843) [hereinafter Davis
Petitioner Brief].
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Title IX covers student-to-student sexual harassment, the petitioner's argument followed this complex path:
Argument Chain:
Congress enacted Title IX to prohibit sex discrimination
in federally funded education programs.
(indisputable premise)

Title IX's proscription against sex discrimination is broad
(virtually indisputable)

;C7

';;

Title IX's broad terms neither enumerate
specific conduct nor specify particular
actors that fall within its proscription
(indisputable premise)

Title IX is broader than Title VII
(indisputable)

Title VII, unlike Title IX, enumerates
the specific actors (employers) who
must perform the discriminatory act
for liability to attach (indisputable)

Title IX's breadth and lack of specificity
means it covers a wide scope of victims.
For example, employees are covered
though they are not specified in the text,
because they are also not excluded
(virtually indisputable;
this is S.Ct. precedent)

Even though Title VII enumerates
employers as the specific actors prohibited from discriminating, it covers
discrimination by peer coworkers,
third parties and non-agents (virtually
indisputable; this is S.Ct. precedent)

since the text also does \not

r/

specify the actors who must
perform the discriminatory
act, that must mean that
students are included in the
proscription, because, like
employees, they are not
excluded
(advocated premise)

'7

"

If the narrower Title VII

[

[

acovers peer harassment,
even though the discrimina] tory actor is specified, then
] the broader Title IX must
also cover peer harassment
advocated premise)

[
[
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In both chains, the advocated premise is preceded by several premises that
either must be agreed with or are virtually indisputable. The reader is set
early on a path of acquiescence. Moreover, the argument premises are
linked so that the premise of one forms the foundation or reason for the next
one, so that agreement with the prior premise leads to agreement with the
subsequent. The form of the chain is: if A, then B; if B, then C; etc. The
premises that lead up to the advocated premise are not only individually
difficult for the reader to disagree with (A, B, and C are all uncontroversial),
but also interconnected so that it is difficult to agree with one and disagree
with the next (if you agree with A, you must agree with B, because the form
of the chain is that if A, then B).
The two chains work on the same principle as the foot-in-the-door in
that they play on the reader's preference for consistency. The chains create
for the reader a cache of prior consistent decisions linked to the advocated
premise, so that the reader will be likely to experience dissonance if she
rejects the advocated premise. It is, of course, still possible for the reader to
disagree with the advocated premise, because the logic here only looks
ironclad. But the chain makes acquiescence easier mentally, because it
makes acquiescence seem more consistent with the reader's beliefs. If the
reader rejects the advocated premise, she will have to work to resolve the
apparent inconsistency created by her rejection.
The foot-in-the-door phenomenon can be especially useful to the advocate who must make comparisons that are both unconventional and push
the boundaries of law and social norms. In the Davis example, an inevitable
consequence of petitioner's argument is that an elementary school child can
be a sexual harasser, a position that is socially and culturally problematic.
Yet, petitioner's argument chains are constructed in a way that makes the
comparison appear simple and conventional. For example, in the chain
comparing Title VII to Title IX, the reasoning is a simple syllogism that is
difficult to dispute: if X is broader than Y, and X covers B, Y must cover B
also. The chain encourages the reader to focus on this simple transitive
instead of the more problematic comparison between peers who are office
coworkers and peers who are elementaly school students.
But, foot-in-the-door can also help in cases where the advocate decides to-or must--confront a difficult legal or social norm directly. In
these cases, foot-in-the-door chaining can help by convincing the reader that
a particular decision is properly included in the prior cache the reader will
use to make the decision. For example, in the case of Rosa v. Park West
Bank and Trust Co.," plaintiff-appellant Rosa, a biological male, was denied a loan by the defendant bank because he appeared for his loan request

47.

214 F.3d 213 (lst Cir. 2000).
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dressed in "traditionally female" clothing.4 8 The audience might not have
readily made the comparison between Rosa and Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins,49 in which a woman was denied partnership in part because of her
abrasive, aggressive demeanor. The argument chain crafted by appellant
Rosa, however, makes this non-obvious connection seem self-evident:
Actions based on sexual stereotypes are acts of impermissible sex discrimination (virtually indisputable, S.Ct. precedent).
When a firm denies a woman partnership because the woman did not meet the
finn's stereotype of femininity, the firm has impermissibly discriminated
against her (virtually indisputable, S.Ct. precedent).
When a woman is told that she should walk, talk and dress more femininely,
she is the victim of impermissible sex stereotyping because she did not conform
to notions of what a "real woman" should look like (virtually indisputable,
S.Ct. precedent).
When a man is told to dress in a more masculine fashion, he is the victim of sex
stereotyping because he has not conformed to what a "real man" should look
like (advocated premise).
When a man is the victim of sex stereotyping, he has been subject to an act of
impermissible sex discrimination (advocated premise).

The chain works, in part, because of the foot-in-the-door principle. It
is constructed in such a way that the reader is led to believe that if she
agrees with the prior premises, she must find for appellant Rosa. In other
words, if the reader believes sex stereotyping is illegal, she must agree that
the bank's behavior was also illegal. A decision against appellant Rosa
would be inconsistent and dissonant.
3. "Door in the Face": Create a Scenario of InitialRejection

Seemingly contrary to foot-in-the-door, there is some research that
compliance is enhanced by making a large request first." The strategy of
48. Jennifer L. Levi & Mary L. Bonauto, Brief of Plaintiff-AppellantLucas Rosa in
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 149
(2001) (reprinting the brief in full with minor changes).
49. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
50. Of course, the foot-in-the-door effect in this case, as in most, will depend on
whether the audience accepts the advocate's characterization of precedent. For a true footin-the-door effect, the legal audience must actually agree with the premises, not simply acknowledge that it is bound by precedent. The agreement is what drives the consistency and
dissonance reactions. Argument chains like this one also have the effect of making the legal
audience feel that the advocate's premise is required by precedent. This is also an effective
strategy, but is slightly different from foot-in-the-door.
51. See O'KEEFE, supra note 8, at 172-73.
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beginning a persuasive message with a more contentious proposition that
the reader is likely to reject is called the "door in the face" strategy. 2 The
research shows that the recipient, having rejected the first larger request, is
thereafter somewhat more inclined to acquiesce to a second, smaller request. 3 Door-in-the-face is not as consistently successful as foot-in-thedoor, however, and can depend on context.
For example, door-in-the-face is effective mostly if there is little or no
time delay between requests, if there is no change in the identity of the requester, and if the request relates to the public interest or other humanitarian
cause. 4 Although these limitations suggest that the door-in-the-face is a
somewhat unpredictable persuasive tactic, many of them (time delay, identity of requester) will not affect the application of the strategy to persuasive
legal writing. However, in considering door-in-the-face in the advocacywriting context, it is important to be clear that door-in-the-face persuades
the target to acquiesce to the smaller request; the result is not that the audience eventually acquiesces to the larger request.
Nevertheless, the door-in-the-face phenomenon, and particularly the
explanations for why door-in-the-face works, should be of interest to the
persuasive legal writer. At first glance, door-in-the-face seems to be of
greatest relevance to legal negotiators in that it confirms the longstanding
negotiating practice of posing an initial request that overshoots the desired
outcome.
But the principles that underlie door-in-the-face can bear on
advocacy techniques as well, and have the potential to change the way advocates think about forward chaining in certain contexts.
One primary explanation for the effectiveness of door-in-the-face is
that it works because the sequence of the requests can reestablish the interaction between persuader and target as a bargaining or negotiation interchange, as opposed to a situation where the persuader is "acting upon" a
passive message recipient.56 Once the situation is reestablished as a negotiation, the social "rules" of negotiation apply, one of which is that concession
52.
53.

Id. at 171.
ScU
i. at 171-72. in one experiment, fnr example, a student approached people

near a college campus asking them to volunteer two hours per week for two years at a local
juvenile detention center. Not one person agreed to this request. However, 50 percent of
those to whom the initial request was made agreed to a second request to take a group from
the detention center to the zoo for two hours. Only 17 percent in the control group, to whom
no initial request was made, agreed to the zoo trip. Id.at 172; see also Daniel J.O'Keefe,
Guilt as a Mechanism of Persuasion, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN

THEORY AND PRACTICE 333 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002).
54. See O'KEEFE, supra note 8, at 172-73.
55. See, e.g., Richard Birke & Craig Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating
Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 1 (1999); Michael P. Vandenburgh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 53 (2003).
56. See O'KEEFE, supra note 8, at 172.
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by one side should be reciprocated by concession on the other. Thus, the
persuader's concession in asking for the smaller request leads to concession
in the message recipient, and the recipient is led to accede to the smaller
request.
Relatedly, some researchers attribute the door-in-the-face effect to the
message recipient's feelings of obligation, responsibility, or duty to someone who has made a concession or done the recipient "a favor." 7 For this
reason, the effect is likely to be stronger in cultures in which "tit-for-tat"
reciprocity is the norm. Others attribute the door-in-the-face effect to guilt:
refusal to accept the initial request induces guilt and agreeing to the smaller
request reduces it." Another explanation posits that the contrast between
the two requests increases the likelihood of agreement to the smaller, because the message recipient perceives the smaller request as less burdensome because she will compare it to the larger request.59
A number of things about these explanations bear closer examination
in the persuasive-legal-writing context. First, the implication that door-inthe-face works by changing the nature of the interaction between persuader
and recipient is something that should pique the interest of any advocate.
Persuasion is, at its core, a coercive process.' Yet, no one likes to feel as
though she is being coerced. In fact, a danger of pushing too hard with any
persuasive message is a phenomenon called "psychological reactance," in
which the message recipient perceives the persuasive message as a threat to
her autonomous decisionmaking.6' The message recipient will seek to reestablish her autonomy through various means, which can result in a boomerang effect. 2
The explanations for door-in-the-face suggest that this strategy
changes the appearance of the persuasive process so that it looks less coercive and more like a dialogue, which in turn may reduce the risk of a boomerang effect. Altering the process of audience decisionmaking is one of
the primary ways for a persuader to gain compliance (the other being altering the content of the message).63 In typical advocacy situations, the per57.
58.
59.
60.

See Rhoads & Cialdini, supra note 25, at 516.
See O'Keefe, supra note 53, at 333-34.
See O'KEEFE, supra note 8, at 172.
See generally Gerald Miller, On Being Persuaded,in THE PERSUASION HAND-

BOOK: DEVELOPMENTS INTHEORY AND PRACTICE 4 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds.,

2002) (stating effectiveness of persuasion depends on coercion and a complex web of threats
and promises). The legal system itself is replete with this kind of coercion. See Robert
Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601-02 (1986). Miller and Cover make
similar points: just because the violence or coercion underneath a system is not direct or
obvious, does not mean it is not there. But both foot-in-the-door and door-in-the-face indicate that how coerced the recipientfeels can make a substantial difference.
61.
Burgoon et al., supra note 39, at 215-16.
62. Id.
63. FUNKHOUSER, supra note 7, at 101.
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suader uses certain techniques to gain something from the recipient, whose
role is to "receive" the message and make a decision; the persuader is
"working on" the recipient. Door-in-the-face seems to work by changing
the recipient's perception of her role in the dialogue from the more coercive
"worked on" to the more cooperative "worked with."
Instead of someone who "receives" the message and makes a decision,
the recipient becomes someone who is actively engaged with the persuader
in finding a solution to the problem (as with two negotiating parties).' This
role makes the persuader look less like a coercer, which reduces the threat
to the recipient's feelings of autonomy and reduces the possibility of psychological reactance. Instead, persuader and recipient look like partners in
the quest for mutual agreement. In addition to encouraging compliance, this
perception can also increase the recipient's motivation, a psychological state
that is favorable to the persuader. In the words of one researcher, the doorin-the-face technique "empowers the requester through rejection."65
The other facet of door-in-the-face that should be of interest to the legal advocate is that, as with foot-in-the-door, audience self-concept plays a
central role in the persuasive process. Whereas with foot-in-the-door the
recipient is moved to comply so that she behaves consistently with her (possibly idealized) self-concept, with door-in-the-face the initial rejection can
create a conflict with the recipient's self-concept. Rejecting an initial foray
can elicit feelings of guilt or hypocrisy and make the recipient question
whether she is-or wants to be-the kind of person who says "no" to certain requests.66 The persuasive message has created a subtle threat to the
recipient's self-image that the recipient will be motivated to resolve.67 The
persuasive message that elicits rejection can work to compromise the recipient's feelings of integrity-for example, her feelings that she is a moral,
ethical, fair person.68 The recipient seeks to reduce this threat (or "cognitive
dissonance") by complying with the second request, thereby reaffirming her
self-image.69
Compliance that is the result of a threat to the recipient's self-concept
and the resulting feelings of guilt is called "transgression compliance," because it is the recipient's perceived or actual "transgression" that drives the
compliance." Transgressions have a "powerful" and "dependable" effect
64. Kelton & Cialdini, supra note 25, at 516 (stating "[t]hose who comply in the
face of concessions report that they feel more control over" and "more satisfied" with the
results of the interchange).
65. Id. at 515.
66. O'Keefe, supra note 53, at 331-32 (describing the effectiveness of guilt and
hypocrisy induction strategies).
67. Id. at 335.
68. Id.
69. Harmon-Jones, supra note 33, at 100-02.
70. O'Keefe, supra note 53, at 332.
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on subsequent compliance. 7' Although powerful, transgression compliance
is a persuasive strategy with significant risks. The primary risk is that most
people do not like to have their self-concept threatened, and may react with
anger or resentment, neither of which are conducive to persuasion.72 However, this negative effect is more pronounced when the persuader explicitly
points out the recipient's inconsistency, and is less likely when the persuader simply creates a scenario in which the message recipient independently realizes it, which is what happens with door-in-the-face.73
The complex psychological processes that make up the decisionmaking
process during door-in-the-face encounters can be useful information for the
persuasive legal writer. First of all, door-in-the-face implies some support
for preceding an argument chain with the conclusion, however controversial, because initial reader skepticism can prime the reader for future compliance. Relatedly, and perhaps more surprisingly, the door-in-the-face
phenomenon contradicts one of the most widely held pieces of conventional
wisdom in advocacy: advocates should never ask for anything more than
they need to get the desired result for the client, and they certainly should
not start a brief with an argument that is likely to elicit rejection." Consistent with foot-in-the-door, the conventional wisdom is that the narrowest
and least controversial request represents the surest route to persuading a
judge, and the advocate should always start the brief with the strongest (surest) argument.75
The door-in-the-face phenomenon suggests that, in some instances, it
may be worthwhile for the advocate to rethink or reject this piece of conventional wisdom, and that it may be less risky to do so than legal advocates
think. While I am not suggesting that advocates start briefs with high-risk
arguments of dubious validity, the data does suggest that the rigid conservatism of legal writing might be worth rethinking in some cases. The data
offers some support for advocates to take greater risks and use more creativ71. Id.
72. Id. at 337-39.
73. Id. at 338. For example, an explicit statement that the message recipient has
behaved inconsistently in the past, sometimes called a "hypocrisy induction," can lead to a
boomerang effect. There is a difference, however, between that more aggressive strategy and
the door-in-the-face.
74. See, e.g., BEAZLEY, supra note 10, at 152-53 (emphasizing importance of not
raising "fringe" or risky issues on appeal); ALDISERT, supra note 6, at 118-20, 139-40, 145
(urging lawyers to avoid risky arguments, and to state the issues on appeal "as narrowly as
possible to achieve [the client's] objective"). Interestingly, although Judge Aldisert exhorts
lawyers to throw out all arguments except the strongest two or three, he drops a footnote that
tells an anecdote of a winning argument that was almost left out of a brief. See id. at 120 n.8.

75.

See, e.g.,

GIRVAN PECK, WRITING PERSUASIVE BRIEFS

133-34 (1984) (encourag-

ing advocates to make strongest arguments first); ALDISERT, supra note 6, at 117, 139-40,
211 (strongly recommending that arguments start with most powerful point, one with "reasonable probability to persuade," and "throwaway" issues should be last).
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ity in legal argumentation, and to do so earlier in the brief. For example, an
advocate might consider an argument chain that employs door-in-the-face
principles in contexts such as "impact" litigation, where a big request may
be worth the risk, or when a client can get a favorable result with a safer
argument but would ultimately be better served by a riskier one. Beginning
the chain with the riskier proposal may elicit rejection (or it may not), but it
can also prime the audience for compliance with smaller assertions. The
door-in-the-face phenomenon implies that the advocate does not lose much
by making the big request-and actually may gain ground, particularly if a
smaller request is also a part of the chain, and is still ultimately a "winner"
for the client.
Finally, the success of door-in-the-face challenges the idea that arguing in the alternative, or offering a number of different routes to the desired
outcome, is evidence of a weak argument. Door-in-the-face, like starting an
argument chain with a bigger premise and then proposing a smaller one, is a
kind of "argument in the alternative." Although arguing in the alternative is
a familiar strategy, it is one that advocates disagree about. While some
commentators see argument in the alternative as a valid persuasive strategy,
others caution that the strategy can make both arguments appear weak.76
Echoing the explanations for door-in-the-face, the concerns about "argument in the alternative" are that the strategy makes the advocate look like
she is negotiating, and therefore that she herself is not fully persuaded by or
committed to the bigger argument. However, the data about door-in-theface suggests that the advocate's shift to a stance that looks more like negotiation can be a position of strength rather than weakness, precisely because
it looks less like a power play, and encourages the recipient to react as if she
were negotiating.
On the other hand, the legal culture is not one in which "tit-for-tat" reciprocity is the norm between judges and lawyers. Judges know that they
are the decisionmakers and most are not disposed to "negotiate" with counsel about a decision; they are less likely to feel the sense of guilt or obligation that lead to the door-in-the-face reaction. Nevertheless, reciprocity is
the Orm, A e
cn..ity, and Judge res undoubtedly at least somewhat susceptible to the "social rules" of discourse, particularly when the
issue is one--or the persuader presents an argument-that induces feelings
of guilt or hypocrisy that the audience is moved to resolve. The door-in-

76. See, e.g., ALDISERT, supra note 6, at 117 (throughout the book, Judge Aldisert
admonishes lawyers to avoid "throwaway" or risky issues). Judge Aldisert notes emphatically, "Put your best foot forward. And only your best foot!" Id. at 140-41. This suggests
that arguing in the alternative is not an effective persuasive strategy. Later in the book, however, Judge Aldisert notes the benefits of arguing in the alternative, stating that providing
alternate, independent grounds for relief increases the advocate's chances of winning. Id
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the-face data suggests that this strategy might be especially useful in cases
that raise important or compelling policies related to the public interest.
In designing legal argument chains, door-in-the-face suggests great
care in the crafting of those first links. The first premises must be large
enough to induce rejection, but not so large that rejection is reasonable and
the recipient believes that the rejection is appropriately a reflection of her
attitudes and beliefs.77 Unlike foot-in-the-door, it is important for door-inthe-face messages not to trigger the self-scan process in such a way as to
confirm for the audience that continuous rejection would be the most consistent (and affirming) approach.7" Moreover, the initial premise(s) must not
be absurd or likely to stimulate a hostile response; they need only be of sufficiently greater magnitude to incur rejection-just a few steps away from
the critical request with which compliance is sought.79
4. Argument Chains that "Work on " the "Doorin the Face " Principle
Because the door-in-the-face principle conflicts with a longstanding
tradition of appellate advocacy writing, briefs that begin with an aggressive,
controversial premise are rarer than those that begin with benign, agreeable
premises. There are, however, some examples that demonstrate the tactic.
In the plaintiff-respondent's brief in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,8" for
example, the respondent began her merits brief before the United States
Supreme Court by arguing that certiorari was improvidently granted, and
made arguments about the record that she did not make in her brief responding to the petition for certiorari.81
Although beginning the merits brief with this argument had its strategic and logical advantages, the argument had many of the hallmarks of a
door-in-the-face initial request.82 First, it was risky. It was highly unlikely
that the Supreme Court would accede to an argument that raised something
new in the merits brief that was not argued in the response to the petition for
certiorari, which, as petitioner pointed out, was the more appropriate place
77. Burgoon & Bettinghaus, supranote 19, at 159.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
81. Brief of Respondent Mechelle Vinson at 1, 15-23, Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979), 1986 WL 728234, at 1, 8-11 [hereinafter Meritor
Respondent's Brief]; see also Reply Brief of Petitioner, Meritor,477 U.S. 57 (No. 84-1979),
1986 WL 728303 [hereinafter MeritorPetitioner's Reply Brief].
82. As a matter of strategy, leading with this argument gave respondent a context for
raising factual arguments central to her theory of the case. Logically, it made sense to lead
with it as a procedural issue. See, e.g., ALDISERT, supra note 6, at 139 (procedural issues are
"threshold" issues that logically must come first).
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for the argument procedurally." Moreover, there was nothing to indicate
that there was disagreement among the members of the Court about granting
the petition for certiorari, which means that, at a minimum, four Justices
voted to grant certiorari and the others did not feel strongly enough to dissent. 4 Second, the attack on certiorari was a "big" request. It asked the
Court to reverse its initial decision and publicly admit that it had mistakenly
granted the original cert petition. Finally, the request asked for a "big" win;
were respondent to convince the Court to reverse its initial grant of certiorari, that decision would let stand as precedent a court of appeals opinion
highly favorable to the respondent on a number of cutting-edge issues. For
all of these reasons, the Court was likely to reject the argument, and, indeed,
it did. Neither the majority opinion nor the two separate concurring opinions even mention the argument.
On the other hand, the request was neither unreasonable nor absurd,
and there is evidence that the Court found aspects of it persuasive. Aspects
of the respondent's arguments about certiorari, particularly the abstract and
ambiguous quality of key facts in the record, are echoed in the Court's discussion of respondeat superior liability. 5 A request that involves a high risk
of rejection but is reasonable is critical to the door-in-the-face response.
Moreover, the respondent achieves a number of significant victories with
the arguments that follow the "big" request, including an overall win on
result (the Court affirmed the favorable decision below). But, respondent
also achieves victories on a smaller scale. For example, the Court somewhat surprisingly accepts respondent's argument about how "voluntary"
sexual conduct can be the result of "unwelcome" sexual advances. It also
accepts the validity of her analogy to racial harassment cases. 6
83. MeritorPetitioner's Reply Brief, supranote 81, at 2-3.
84. PSFS Savings Bank v. Vinson, 474 U.S. 815 (1985) (petition for certiorari
granted; no dissenting opinions).
85. Compare Meritor Respondent's Brief, supra note 81, at 16-18 (record is
"cloud[ed]" and "ambigu[ous]" because a key finding of fact is "wholly hypothetical" and
makes "any consideration of notice, knowledge, policy or procedure ... wholly abstract"),
with Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (question of employer liability has "rather abstract quality"
because of "state of record" and makes determination of notice standard premature).
86. The difference between "welcome" advances and "voluntary" conduct is a core
theory of respondent's case, but a difficult point to explain. Nevertheless, the Court got it.
Compare Meritor Respondent's Brief, supra note 81, at 35-36 (court of appeals was correct
in finding that "sexual intercourse may appear voluntary even though the advances that initiated it were entirely unwelcome"), with Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68 ("correct inquiry is whether
respondent ... indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her
actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary"). The race analogy is less difficult,
but could easily have been rejected, given a history of some divergence between sex and race
cases and petitioner's heavy reliance in its brief on the distinction between sex and race.
Compare Meritor Respondent's Brief, supra note 81, at 44-45, with Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66
(same principle used for racial harassment cases should be used in sexual harassment cases).
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The context of Meritor is also consistent with the door-in-the-face
phenomenon. The Court characterized the behavior in the case as "pervasive harassment" as well as "criminal conduct of the most serious nature."87
Moreover, the Court notes that because the petitioner's grievance procedure
required respondent to complain first to her supervisor, who was also the
perpetrator, it was "not altogether surprising that respondent failed to invoke
the procedure."88 The allegations make the case one in which an initial rejection might very well induce a guilt or dissonance reaction, making even
Supreme Court Justices wonder whether they are the "kind of people" who
decide that this conduct is without federal remedy. Consistent with the
door-in-the-face strategy, respondent's brief first lays the groundwork for a
dissonance reaction, and then offers multiple ways to resolve it, several of
which the Court takes.
While it is impossible to say with certainty whether the result in Meritor is a function of the door-in-the-face phenomenon, the case gives an excellent example of how the strategy might translate in an appellate writing
context, and demonstrates a result that is consistent with a door-in-the-face
response. At the very least, the example should give advocates pause about
the conventional wisdom of appellate writing that advocates should always
make the least controversial request first. It seems clear that the respondent
did not lose anything by leading with a "big" request, and there is some
evidence that she may have gained some ground. Meritor, along with the
social-science data, demonstrates that the safe route is not the only route,
and gives creative advocates yet another tool for persuasion.
III. AFFECTING AUDIENCE INVOLVEMENT
A critical variable affecting the impact of a persuasive message is the
level of involvement of the target audience with the issue and the message. 9
"Involvement" in social science is something of a term of art, and, although
it is a complicated concept, generally refers to the level of personal relevance to the issue felt by the audience.9" It is what allows the audience to
connect the content of the persuasive message to personal experience, or to
personal beliefs or values.91
87. Meritor,477 U.S. at 67.
88. Id at 73. The Court also noted wryly that "[p]etitioner's contention that respondent's failure [to report] should insulate it from liability might be substantially stronger if its
procedures were better calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come forward." Id.
89. Michael D. Slater, Involvement as Goal-DirectedStrategic Processing:Extending the Elaboration Likelihood Model, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE

175, 175 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002).

90. O'KEEFE, supra note 8, at 99.
91. Slater, supra note 89, at 177. It should be noted here that some researchers
disagree over the definition of involvement, with some limiting it narrowly to the concept of
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Defined this way, audience involvement is not a new concept for persuasive legal writers. However, while legal writers have long sought to
influence the level of audience connection with a legal issue, the conventional wisdom of persuasive legal writing can treat the relationship between
emotional or motivating arguments and their result as a kind of linear equation. The thinking often runs along these lines: if an advocate makes the
"right" motivating argument, the judge will "want" to make a decision consistent with the policy or value raised by the argument and will be more
inclined to make a decision in the advocate's favor.92
While this is undoubtedly part of the story, the social-science data
shows that when an advocate makes a convincing motivating argument,
something else-something a bit more complex-happens to the audience
other than picking from among competing values. While there is no question that most people, judges included, will respond to arguments directed at
values, the question is why, and how? A look at the data and theories about
audience involvement-and there is a great deal of it-reveals that involvement or motivation is a significantly more complex and multifaceted
concept that deserves more thoughtful treatment by legal advocates.93
A. How Involvement Affects the Decisionmaking Process
One of the most interesting things about audience involvement is that
it affects not only the ultimate decision, but also the process by which a
person thinks about a persuasive message. In other words, involvement
plays such a central role in what the ultimate decision or result is because it
affects how the decision is made. A motivating argument can affect how
the judge reads the briefs, how she approaches the arguments made, what
direct personal relevance and others including such things as the person's view of the issue's
importance, or the connection between the person's self-concept and the issue. O'KEEFE,
supra note 8, at 111.
92. The typical tools for influencing involvement-policy arguments, factual narratives-are often discussed as though the primary challenge lies in discovering the most emotionally resonant policies or facts, which, if they bear on a value held by the judge, will lead
the judge to a favorable decision. WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 6668 (2002); see also SIRICO & SCHULTZ, supranote 38, at 103-04; CATHY GLASER ET AL., THE
LAWYER'S CRAFT: AN

INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL ANALYSIS,

ADVOCACY 318-20 (2002); WELLFORD, supra note 38, at 318.

WRITING,

RESEARCH,

AND

Another theory posits that

decisionmakers have a value system comprised of numerous beliefs and attitudes that are
ordered in a hierarchy of importance. One purpose of rhetorical strategies aimed at judicial
values is to "activate" favorable values and "deactivate" unfavorable ones, or otherwise
influence the importance of competing values in the judge's system. See MICHAEL R. SMiH,
ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING 60--61
(2002).
93.

But see Wangerin, supra note 19, at 200 (acknowledging that involvement is

central to persuasion, but arguing that it has little or nothing to do with "the structure of
persuasive arguments").
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kinds of arguments will sway her, and whether her decision will be strong
and long-lasting or weak and easily shakable. To truly understand what she
is doing when she makes arguments directed toward audience motivation,
therefore, the advocate must understand involvement and how it affects the
process by which decisions are made.
The relationship between audience involvement and the decisionmaking process is described by a theory called the Elaboration Likelihood
Model (ELM). The ELM posits that evaluation of persuasive arguments
takes place on a continuum; at one end of the continuum is central route
processing and at the other is peripheral route processing.94 Central and
peripheral processing of persuasive messages differ in the depth of audience
consideration of the issue and the message. Central route processing is
characterized by careful, critical evaluation of the merits of arguments, or
"high elaboration." During central route processing, the message recipient
actively engages with the persuasive message, generating her own thoughts
and arguments in response to the information she has received.95 Peripheral
route processing, on the other hand, is less thoughtful and engaged, and is
often based on heuristics or shortcuts unrelated to the substantive merits of
the message.96 For example, when a judge considers whether the facts of a
precedent case are applicable or distinguishable from the case before her,
she is actively engaged with the merits of the arguments before her, and
processes more centrally. When a judge decides to reject an argument because the advocate lacks credibility, the process is more peripheral.97
One of the tenets of the ELM is that, generally, as audience involvement increases, the audience moves toward central processing of the persuasive message; as it decreases, the audience moves toward peripheral processing.9" A typical experiment testing audience involvement studied the
decisionmaking processes of college undergraduate students.99 The students
heard identical persuasive messages advocating that senior comprehensive
examinations be required as a condition of graduation."° The only variable
was that one group of students was told that the policy was to be adopted at
their institution (high-involvement condition) and another group was told
94. Steve Booth-Butterfield & Jennifer Welbourne, The Elaboration Likelihood
Model: Its Impact on Persuasion Theory and Research, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY & PRACTICE 155, 157 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds.,
2002); O'KEEFE, supra note 8, at 98.
95. Booth-Butterfield & Welboume, supranote 94, at 156-57.
96. Id. at 156.
97. See id. at 158.
98. Id. at 159-60. There are a number of other variables that impact how a message
is processed, according to the ELM, including the level of message complexity and message
repetition. O'KEEFE, supra note 8, at 99.

99.
100.

O'KEEFE, supra note

Id.

8, at 100.
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that the policy was to be adopted at a different, far away institution (lower
involvement). 1 In contrast to the low-involvement group, the highinvolvement group exhibited decisionmaking processes associated with the
central route-that is, more thoughtful consideration of the arguments." 2
The students who felt more personally connected to the issue were more
careful and critical in their evaluation of the merits.
In terms of persuasive legal writing, this data confirms something relatively unsurprising: the decision in a case will be affected by how much the
audience cares about the issue."' More specifically, the ELM suggests that
the degree of attention that the judicial audience gives to a case or an advocate's argument will vary with the judges' level of involvement in the issue.
While the description of central route processing sounds like the process in
which most judges engage when evaluating briefs, it is unlikely that judges
process all messages with the same degree of elaboration. Judges are
busy,"' and likely prioritize both the cases and the arguments and give different levels of attention to different cases, issues, and arguments.
The ELM also suggests that advocates can influence the level of attention given to their persuasive messages by influencing the level of involvement the reader feels. The advocate can move the audience closer to central
processing and more elaboration or push her away from central processing
to a more peripheral consideration.'
While most persuasive legal writers
are aware of the importance of influencing how much their audience cares
about an issue, what they may not know is that involvement has a significant effect on the ultimate decision because it affects the process of audience decisionmaking.
So, why should legal writers care about how the audience processes
the message? Why would they want to influence the decisionmaking process? After all, the ELM does not purport to direct the substance of persuasive messages. 1°" Advocates can achieve a "good" (or "bad") result through
either central or peripheral processing." 7 Moreover, advocates already use a
number of strategies to influence involvement--even if they do not know
the social-science term of art. Policy arguments, analogies or examples,
precedent

c1oice....
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.
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invao'vement.

101. Id.
102. Id. at 99.
103. Id. at 177.
104. See ALDISERT, supranote 6, at 115-16.
105. Although complicated, audience involvement is not static or purely internal;
rather, it can be "situationally induced." Booth-Butterfield & Welbourne, supra note 94, at
160.
106. Andrew J. Cook, Kevin Moore & Gary D. Steel, The Taking of a Position: A
Reinterpretationof the ElaborationLikelihood Model, 34 J. THEORY Soc. BEHAv. 315, 318
(2004).
107.
O'KEEFE, supra note 8, at 105.
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in different ways and to different degrees. Is it really necessary for legal
advocates to understand the intricacies of how involvement affects result?
The answer is yes. Legal advocates should care about how the audience processes the message. They will be better and more effective writers
if they understand and have greater control over their handling of involvement. A main reason that legal writers should care about the decisionmaking process is that, in the context of persuasion (as with many areas of law),
process is inextricably entangled with result. It is an axiom of legal practice
that if you influence the process, you influence the result, and advocacy is
no exception. With involvement, the ways in which the decisionmaking
process can affect result is illuminated by the differences between the central and peripheral processes of decisionmaking.
There are two primary differences between the decisionmaking processes that will interest the persuasive legal writer seeking to influence involvement: the different decisionmaking routes (1) call for different argument strategies and (2) produce different kinds of decisions. In terms of
argument strategy, different kinds of persuasive messages will influence the
message recipient who processes centrally versus the recipient who processes peripherally. For example, substantive argument merits are quite important to central processing, and less important to messages processed peripherally. When recipients process centrally, strong merits arguments will
elicit favorable results and weak arguments will elicit unfavorable results.'
Things like typographical errors and advocate credibility become less important as a person moves closer to central processing of a message."° The
opposite is true for messages processed peripherally."' In peripheral route
processing, argument merits exercise less influence on the message recipient. Strong merits arguments will not necessarily yield favorable results,
and weak arguments will do less damage. Rather, things like advocate likeability or credibility will loom larger in the decision."'
Central and peripheral processing also differ in the strength of the result they produce. The decision that results from central processingbecause it is based on an elaborative, critical process of argument evaluation-is likely to be stronger and more persistent than decisions reached
through peripheral processing." 2 Because during central processing the
message recipient, often independently, has generated, evaluated, and answered counterarguments to the arguments presented, the resulting decision
is less vulnerable to counterarguments raised by opponents. "' Decisions
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 110.
Id.at 97-98.
Id. at 110.
Id. at98.
Booth-Butterfield & Welbourne, supra note 94, at 157.
Id. at 157-58.
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resulting from peripheral processing, on the other hand, are more vulnerable
and held with less confidence.
At the very least, this data suggests that legal advocates approach involvement and motivation carefully, with an understanding that motivating
arguments will affect the audience decisionmaking process, and with an eye
toward what kind of process might favor the client's position. This disrupts
some of the linearity with which lawyers have approached audience motivation. Audience involvement does not simply lead the decisionmaker in a
straight line to a particular decision.
Moreover, the persuasive legal writer needs to know that involvement
will affect how much influence strong (and weak) merits arguments will
have on the reader, and how critically the reader will assess them. She
should also know that when she makes a motivating argument, she is not
merely giving the judge a reason to find for her client; she is ensuring that
the audience will give close, critical consideration to the merits of the arguments, testing the argument with self-generated counterarguments and examples."' It is also important for her to know how certain decisions she
makes will affect the impact of other rhetorical features of the argument,
such as her own credibility or likeability, or grammatical or typographical
errors.
This is important news; it can mean the difference between winning
and losing. Legal advocates are well-aware that argument merits are not the
only influence on judicial decisionmaking; they know that credibility, how a
brief looks, and other things unrelated to substance can affect the decision." 5 But, they may not have known that they can assert some control
over how much influence these criteria have. There will certainly be times
when an advocate wants scrutiny that is more careful and considered. But
there are also times-for example, if she wants a summary affirmance or a
denial of review or certiorari, or if her position has a strong surface appeal
but will weaken under critical scrutiny-that she might prefer a less central
process or a process that is more influenced by peripheral cues. In either
case, she should have control over the tools that affect these processes. In
addition, the advocate should also know what she risks when courting a
favorable decision through a more peripheral process. The decision might
be favorable, but also vulnerable to her opponent's arguments and subject to
change. This may be a risk that the advocate wants to--or must-take, but
she should do so consciously.
114.

O'KEEFE, supra note

8, at 99; Booth-Butterfield & Welbourne, supra note 94, at

159.
115.
SMITH, supra note 4, at 101, 169; BEAZLEY, supra note 10, at 168, 175; see also
Judith D. Fischer, Bareheaded and Barefaced Counsel: Courts React to Unprofessionalism
in Lawyers 'Papers, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1 (1997).
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Finally, advocates should understand the intricacies of how involvement works, because otherwise they risk using it ineffectively. Advocates
already use strategies to affect involvement, but may not know the nuances
of how particular motivating strategies affect the decisionmaking process,
So, they may be using strategies in ways that are ineffective or, worse,
harmful to their cases. As the following section demonstrates, involvement
is as complex as human motivation, and different advocacy goals call for
different involvement strategies.
B. The Nuances of Audience Involvement
If the first step for the advocate in the use of motivating arguments is
whether and under what circumstances to stimulate audience involvement,
the second question is how to stimulate involvement effectively and knowledgeably. Like the decision whether to push judges toward greater involvement, how to do so is a more complex question than legal advocates
might think. It is a bit more complicated than figuring out what beliefs or
values the judges hold in the greatest esteem and finding a way to connect
those values to the issue in the case. First of all, there are different kinds of
involvement a message recipient can feel, and the recipient will process the
message differently depending on what kind of involvement is experienced."' Second, the different kinds of involvement mean that a message
can be pitched to trigger a certain kind of involvement, depending on how
the advocate wants the recipient to process the message.
1. The Different Kinds ofAudience Involvement
In terms of a message recipient's intrinsic beliefs, social scientists
draw a distinction between "outcome-relevant" involvement and "valuerelevant" involvement." 7 Outcome-relevant involvement refers to a direct
personal stake in the outcome of the issue; the college students in the ELM
study who believed that the graduation requirements at their own institution
were going to change had high outcome-relevant involvement." 8 On the
other hand, value-relevant involvement refers to issues that impact important personal values or beliefs." 9 Message recipients also can experience

116. Booth-Butterfield & Welbourne, supra note 94, at 161-62, 178-80.
117. Id. at 161-62. The same researchers also identified a third type of involvement
called "impression-relevant" involvement, which refers to the link between social interaction
or relationships and message content. Slater, supra note 89, at 177.
118. Slater, supra note 89, at 177.
119. Id.; O'KEEFE, supra note 8, at 99 (message recipient's motivation to consider
message thoughtfully increases as level of personal relevance increases); Cook et al., supra
note 106, at 316.
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12 When a deanother type of involvement called "response involvement.""
cision is in some way public, as are judicial opinions, message recipients
may be motivated to exhibit the "correct" attitude or response, which may
be different from their actual personal belief.'2 ' In a given case, a message
recipient can experience some or all of these different kinds of involvement,
to different degrees for different issues.
Value and outcome involvement, in particular, have very different
(and somewhat surprising) effects on message processing. High outcome
involvement is, as with the graduation requirements study, associated with
central processing. Those recipients with high outcome involvement
showed a high degree of attention to argument merits; they had a favorable
response when confronted with strong arguments and an unfavorable one
when confronted with weak arguments. High value-relevant involvement,
however, was not associated with the same degree of argument attention as
high outcome involvement. 22 Message recipients whose strongly held values were at issue in a case did not show high elaboration and were not influenced favorably by strong arguments (or unfavorably by weak ones).
In terms of message framing, the data suggests that a message crafted
to induce a feeling of personal outcome involvement in the recipient is more
likely to be processed centrally, with great elaboration, and with increased
attention to argument merits.'23 If the message is refrained in terms of more
abstract values, the result is a decreased elaboration, a more peripheral
mode of processing, and minimal impact of argument strength-closer to
what we might call a "knee-jerk" response. 124 As one commentator explained, this means that an appeal to values could be a way to "short-circuit
intelligent debate.' ' 25 Think of how politicians use appeals to "family values" to stimulate a certain response, one that can be quite impervious to
logical arguments.
Another wrinkle is that a value-involved message recipient will experience a different reaction depending on whether the message conflicts
with or confirms her values. If a message conflicts with the recipient's values, the recipient is motivated to "protect" her beliefs ("value-protective
',,
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It .prote t r
sing"
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processing").
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,..e message reCpint
any substantive arguments that conflict with her beliefs by generating
counterarguments. This means that in value-protective situations, stronger
arguments in the persuasive message will not lead to attitude change, and
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O'KEEFE, supranote 8, at 115-16.
Id. at 115-16 n.19.
Id. at 177, 179.
Slater, supranote 89, at 180.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 179-80.
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may make the belief of the message recipient more entrenched. Rather, to
induce attitude change in someone who has strongly held beliefs, the peripheral-not central-route is the more effective means, particularly "if
values are held with any real commitment.' ' 27 In other words, if a person
has strong values and the advocate's desired result conflicts with those values, merits arguments are not likely to wield great influence, regardless of
their strength. The opposite occurs for a value-involved message recipient
when the message confirms her beliefs ("value-affirmative processing")." 8
In that situation, strong merits arguments will influence the message recipi29
ent by making more secure the beliefs consistent with the message.
One of the more interesting involvement studies not only confirmed
that peripheral-not central--cues are the more effective route for changing
the attitudes of value-protective message recipients, but also identified narrative evidence as an effective peripheral cue. In this study, college students were divided into two groups, depending on whether their values inclined them to agree or disagree with the social acceptability of alcohol
use. 3 ° The participants were then subjected to a message about alcohol use,
buttressed either by statistics or by a short narrative depicting the negative
consequences of alcohol on a fellow student. 3 ' The value-protective message recipients demonstrated belief change when confronted with the narrative evidence and were less persuaded by the statistics.3 2 Researchers posited that the narratives circumvented counter-arguing by engaging the message recipients on more affective (and less cognitive) level.' 3 The statistics,
on the other hand, served only to encourage counter-arguing.
The opposite result was reached for the value-affirmative message recipients, who exhibited classic central processing in response to statistical
evidence but were not affected by the narratives.'34 When considering the
formulation of a particular persuasive message, in other words, the study
showed that "statistical evidence is superior for reinforcing beliefs of those
already inclined to believe the message, and anecdotal evidence is superior
for influencing a much more difficult audience-those who disagree with
the message."' 35

127. Id. at 180.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 184.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 180, 184, 188. This is something of a simplification of the conclusions,
which evaluated a number of variables on the path to belief change. Id. at 184.
134. Id. at 184.
135. Id. at 185.
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2. How the Data About Involvement Informs Persuasionin Law
The data about involvement offers some new and challenging information to persuasive legal writers. Among the more interesting information
is the importance of narrative evidence to attitude change. Persuasion by
narrative or anecdote is a strategy that, particularly in legal scholarship, has
engendered a fair amount of controversy but is, nevertheless, commonplace
in law practice.' 36 Even so, the contours of how and why narrative works in
persuasive legal writing, as well as the level of respect it commands as
compared with arguments based on doctrine, continue to be an area of controversy and disagreement.'37
The study of value-protective message processing confirms the persuasive strength and effectiveness of narrative, and adds a couple of intriguing details. It gives legal writers a glimpse of how narrative works-by a
largely peripheral process that discourages counter-arguing-but also on
whom it is most effective. While it is unlikely to have any influence on
people who agree with the message, anecdotal or narrative messages are the
only likely path to attitude change in an audience whose beliefs or values
conflict with the message. By contrast, substantive merits arguments induce
greater entrenchment in the value-protective audience. Not only does this
data give renewed validity to the place of good storytelling in legal argumentation, but it also may bestow some greater respect for the effectiveness
of nontraditional narrative briefs such as that filed by amici in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services.'38 Persuasive legal writers should use this
information to decide not only the structure but the emphasis of their persuasive documents. Deciding how much narrative to include in the brief
and whether to structurally highlight it can affect the outcome, particularly
in cases where the advocate is in a difficult position with a skeptical or hostile audience.
The other intriguing part of the data is the distinct effects on audience
decisionmaking induced by the different kinds of involvement. These dis136.

.. A, r' uy. -on
Daniel A. Farber & Suzarma Sherry, Telling S turie" Oui . u hoo.

Legal Narratives,45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993) (drawing distinction between personal narrative and more conventional "storytelling" in persuasive writing). Farber and Sherry argue
that the personal narrative of legal scholarship is more problematic as a persuasive analytical
tool than the traditional forms of legal narrative, such as personal testimony or a lawyer's
retelling of a client's "story."
137. See, e.g., Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primerfor Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing Techniques to Write PersuasiveFacts Sections, 32 RuT.

L.J. 459, 462-63 (2001) (noting that techniques for fact drafting often get neglected in law
school because professors may believe these skills to be "too soft" or "too mushy" for law
school).
138. Brief for Women Who Have Had Abortions et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellees, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605), 1989
WL 1115239.
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tinct effects suggest that advocates should make conscious, deliberate decisions about crafting their persuasive messages to encourage different types
of audience involvement, depending on what kind of involvement is likely
to serve the client's interests. If the audience experiences response involvement, argument merits will matter less than what the message recipient
thinks the "correct" public response should be. If the message triggers outcome-relevant involvement, the audience will process centrally, arguments
will be evaluated carefully and critically with a high degree of counterarguing, and argument strength will be influential. If the message induces
value-relevant involvement, the audience is likely to process more peripherally, which means argument merits will not be highly influential, and instead the audience will use heuristics or "shortcuts" to make a decision.
The critical piece of information is that legal writers may not know
that when they ratchet up value involvement, they are not necessarily increasing the level of care and attention to their message. Nor are they pushing the reader toward deeper consideration of the merits of the arguments;
in fact, just the opposite is occurring. Advocates ratcheting up value involvement may be "short-circuiting" the elaborative process. They may get
a decision in their favor, but they also risk that the decision might be weak
and vulnerable to counterargument. It is outcome involvement that is the
key to greater depth of message processing, a process in which argument
strength will be a decisive factor.
3. DraftingLegal Arguments to Affect Involvement
Once the advocate decides which process is the best route to the desired outcome, the question becomes how to craft arguments directed at the
kind of involvement most likely to produce that process. Attempting to
trigger response involvement is a common practice in legal brief-writing.
Whenever an advocate makes an argument directed at a judge's concern
over public scrutiny, or that is crafted to "sound good," and is likely to be
one that easily transfers into the opinion, that is directed (in part) toward
response involvement. The key here is that the reasoning offered in the
brief might not be the reasoning that formed the basis of the actual decision
in the advocate's favor; it is, rather, the reason that the judge is most likely
to proffer publicly. That is not to say that the reasons proffered in the opinion are not sometimes (even frequently) identical to the "real" reasons, but
only that sometimes, whether consciously or unconsciously on the part of
the judicial audience, they are not identical.'39 Because of our system of

139. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 3, at 47 (noting that judicial opinions do not lay out
all the stimuli or influences that led a judge to decide a certain way). The difference between
what actually persuades judges to decide a certain way and what they write in their opinions
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requiring judges to report the reasons for their decisions publicly, it is important both to actually persuade the judge and provide reasons that the
judge is willing to put in the opinion for public scrutiny.
For the advocate, pitching an argument to response involvement is a
way of triggering the desire of the audience to be perceived as a certain kind
of person. Most judges, like most people, want to look fair, just, sensitive,
egalitarian, and nondiscriminatory.14 Arguments pitched toward response
involvement are less about trying to make the judge change her core beliefs,
and more about convincing the judge that decision in the advocate's favor is
the most publicly acceptable and puts the judge in the best public light.
Many different types of arguments can trigger response involvement.
For example, when a plaintiff gives great detail about a defendant's bad
behavior in the facts, that is a way of attempting to trigger (among other
reactions) response involvement. Those facts are part of the public record,
and can cause the judicial audience to be acutely aware of the potential public response to the decision. More traditional doctrinal arguments are also
part of response involvement because they are what the legal public will
scrutinize when evaluating the opinion. Lawyers, law professors, and other
judges will expect conventional, sound, doctrinal reasons to be detailed in
the opinion and will test those reasons, sometimes publicly, in the press, in
law journal articles, or in other decisions.
In contrast to response involvement, arguments pitched toward value
or outcome involvement are pitched toward the core beliefs and experiences
of the audience."' They target the actual beliefs of the judicial audience,
and are not to simply influence the perception of how the decision will be
received by the public. It is rare, however, that lawyers think about different kinds of motivation when they craft their arguments. Mostly, when persuasive writers craft motivating or policy arguments, they are thinking about
judicial values. For example, when advocates argue that a proposed rule or
outcome leads to undesirable social results (e.g., by rewarding wrongdoing
or leaving it unpunished, by restricting cherished freedoms, or by punishing
an innocent), they are seeking to increase the connection between the mesoaorto
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is a foundation of the critical legal studies movement. See HUHN, supra note 92, at 61 n. 163
(referring to PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT
140.
REARDON, supra note 33, at 67.

OF REASON (1998)).

141.
O'KEEFE, supra note 8, at 116 n.19. Response involvement is said to be extrinsic because it relies on externals, whereas outcome and value involvement are said to be
intrinsic, because they reflect the internal beliefs of the decisionmaker.
142. HUHN, supra note 92, at 51-53 (noting that policy arguments construe the law
"by reference to the values that the law is intended to serve"); SMITH, supranote 4, at 96-97
(noting that motivating arguments stimulate feelings such as patriotism, hope, and love for
animals or the environment).
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Legal advocates do not give a great deal of thought to outcome involvement, in large part because full outcome involvement is not a practical
goal. No legal argument can construct real outcome involvement, and even
if it could, judges who have a personal stake in an issue-like the college
students who were considering their own graduation requirements-would
almost certainly have to recuse themselves from the decisionmaking process. But, there is a significant grey area between "pure" abstract value involvement and "pure" outcome involvement. Advocates seeking a more
central decisionmaking process need to move the audience toward more
concrete outcome involvement.
For example, some readers will have a greater personal connection to
some issues and more abstract "value" feelings about other issues. This is
similar to the idea that people prioritize their values in a kind of "value hierarchy," and that one of the goals of persuasive writing is to "activate" values on which the audience places the greater priority.143 The information
about involvement, however, adds several critical pieces of information
neglected by the value hierarchy concept. First, the difference between outcome and value involvement suggests to the advocate what kinds of values
may be higher on a reader's hierarchy-that is, those with which the reader
feels a more personal connection. For example, a judge can oppose racial
profiling even if she has no personal connection with profiling. She may
fervently believe that profiling is wrong, but the belief is based in a more
distant, abstract value involvement. At the other end of the spectrum, the
defendant in a case challenging racial profiling has "pure" outcome involvement; the decision in the case will affect her directly. Somewhere in
between, however, are people who feel more personally involved with the
issue, even if they will not be directly affected by the case in any concrete
way.
For example, a judge who is Arab-American, and is deciding a case
involving the racial profiling of Arab-Americans, will not have the same
level of "outcome relevance" as the actual defendant in the case, but her
involvement may lean more toward outcome relevance than the involvement of a judge who has never feared being profiled. Other judges might
have a more distant connection, but still one that is less abstract or hypothetical; maybe they have family or friends who have experienced profiling.
Or maybe the judge has been singled out for unfair treatment based on a
personal characteristic, or has had some other experience that can be connected to the issues raised by profiling. The different levels of involvement
can be illustrated by the following chart:

143.

See Smith, supranote 92 and accompanying text.
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A ------Profiled
in past

B

----------- C---------Value Involvement

Never profiled Never profiled
but member of but stereotyped
in other ways
group often
profiled

Central Process -----------------------------------------------------------------

Decision implicates
values
Abstract belief
against profiling
PeripheralProcess

The second critical piece of information added by the involvement
"spectrum" is that movement on the spectrum does not just affect the substantive decision, but affects the type of process the reader will use to
evaluate the message. Arguments can be framed to stimulate a more general value involvement, which means a more superficial process, or to
stimulate more personal outcome involvement, which would propel the audience toward a more considered, central process. Although advocates cannot count on knowing the personal experiences of their audience, considering outcome and value involvement can still help them make a more conscious choice about argument strategy.
Most lawyers know how to stimulate general value involvement. Often, the kind of policy arguments made by advocates will stimulate value
involvement because they simply point out the social good or evil likely to
follow from a given decision or rule. This can make a judge aware of the
ramifications of a particular decision, but it is not necessarily going to make
a judge care more about the issue or pay more attention to the arguments,
unless she is already close to outcome involvement, in which case she is
likely already aware of the connection.
It is those readers for whom the "outcome" connection is less obvious,
but who nevertheless can be influenced to feel a more personal involvement
in the issue (like the ones in category C, above), who create the greatest
potential for persuasion and who represent the best reason for lawyers to
understand the difference between outcome and value involvement. The
people in this category have the potential for higher involvement in the issue, but may not be aware of their connection to the issue or the strength of
that connection. This is the third, and perhaps most important, piece of information suggested by the involvement "spectrum": that the advocate can
influence the reader's perception of where a particular value or belief falls
on the hierarchy by pushing the reader toward or away from greater outcome involvement.
That is where the skillful legal writer comes in. A legal advocate can
highlight the connections for an audience who may see some connection to
the legal issue but not realize its strength, or even reveal connections that
the audience would never have seen. Lawyers must take great care with
outcome involvement, however. While most legal advocates have a sense
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of the power of putting the audience "in the shoes" of the client, a strategy
that uses this power can easily backfire. Legal culture embraces an ideal of
pure judicial objectivity and tends to deny that personal values--or worse,
personal experience with an issue-can make a difference in judicial decisionmaking.'" Appellate judges, in particular, are reputed to be repelled by
arguments that are overly emotional and personal. 45
Moreover, direct appeals using the second person are often considered
disrespectful and aggressive; lawyers cannot simply argue that the judges
should imagine themselves in the shoes of the aggrieved party.'46 Thus, it is
rare to see a direct appeal to outcome involvement in a brief. Lawyers do
not generally argue, for example, by asking the judge to imagine herself
routinely stopped by police because of her race.'47 Moreover, such an open
appeal is unlikely to work if the judge is probably not ever going to find
herself in those shoes. Finally, any advocate would be wise to tread carefully when presenting the judicial audience with a guilt or hypocrisy induction, which is the form some appeals to involvement can take. 4
Nevertheless, there are a number of ways that lawyers can stimulate
greater outcome involvement, some more direct than others, and all potentially powerful and fully acceptable in legal writing. The more direct methods are slightly riskier, and, as a result, tend to take up less space in the
brief. Nevertheless, they appear with some frequency.
For example, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the
question before the Supreme Court was whether sexual harassment perpetrated by men against men is actionable under Title VII. 149 In his brief, the
petitioner attempted to persuade the Justices that the harassment of him by a
group of his male colleagues occurred because of his sex, even though there
was no evidence that his colleagues' treatment of him stemmed from either

144. The idea of pure judicial objectivity has been critiqued by, among others, the
legal realists, cf Frank, supra note 3, and by critical legal theorists, cf Duncan Kennedy, A
Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 75 (1991), two very different jurisprudential movements.
145. GLASER ET AL., supra note 92, at 314-15; ALDISERT, supranote 6, at 5-6 (noting
one difference between trial and appellate advocacy is the level of "shameless emotional
matters" permissible in the former). See generally Kathryn Stanchi, FeministLegal Writing,
39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 387, 397 n.40 (2002) (listing sources that urge appellate advocates to
eschew overt emotion).
146. Stanchi, supra note 145, at 396 (inviting judges or jury to put themselves in the
shoes of the client violates "Golden Rule") (citing Timothy J. Connor, What You May Not
Say to the Jury, LIIG., Spring 2001, at 36, 37).
147. See id.
148. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text (Singer hypothetical as subtle
hypocrisy induction).
149. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 76 (1998).
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sexual desire or from hostility to males. 5 ° Petitioner had to prove that the
harassers treated him the way they did because of his maleness. In particular, petitioner had to contend with respondents' suggestion that the conduct,
while it might be considered uncivil and even offensive in the "outside"
world, was typical day-to-day life on an isolated all-male oil rig, where the
male employees routinely engaged in aggressive rough-housing when establishing the male pecking order.'
In their briefs, respondents tried to establish distance-i.e., lack of
connection-between the judicial audience and the experience of oil rig
employees. Respondents sought to push the judges away from personal
involvement in a case where the behavior was egregious and shocking; essentially, respondents argued "this could never happen to you."'52 So, a
repeated "theme" in respondents' briefs is that an oil rig is different from
law offices or judicial chambers, and different norms and behavior govern
the different places, and the Justices should not draw conclusions about
what is appropriate for an oil 53rig by imagining the same behavior in a law
office or their own chambers.
Petitioner, on the other hand, tried to emphasize the common ground
between the Justices and the harassed employee. One of petitioner's themes
was the common ground of manhood (Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg
notwithstanding), and what behavior is acceptable (or not) within male
norms. To do so, petitioner's brief-twice within a span of ten pages or
so-comes very close to asking the Justices directly to imagine themselves
in the shoes of the petitioner. In the first reference, petitioner argued:
The gender of Mr. Oncale's harasser neither defines nor detracts from the sexually
harassing nature of the defendants' conduct. To the contrary, one can assert with
some confidence that there is no type of conduct more repulsive to the nonconsenting heterosexual male and more certain to drive him from the work place
than that engaged in by the defendants in this case. Why
is this conduct so degrad1 54
ing and humiliating? Because Joseph Oncale is a man.

The second reference is also quite direct:
Can there be any treatment more demeaning and objectively harassing to a mar.'
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sexual touching and physical, sexual assault by other men with whom he must
work in a closely confined work space... ?155

150. See generally Brief of Petitioner, Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (No. 96-568), 1997 WL
458826 [hereinafter Oncale Petitioner's Brief].
151. Brief of Respondent at 3, 33-38, Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (No. 96-568), 1997 WL
634147 [hereinafter Oncale Respondent's Brief].
152. Id. at 33-40.
153. Id. at 20.
154. Oncale Petitioner's Brief, supra note 150, at 18-19.
155. Id. at 27-28.
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These two passages explode with strategic persuasive content, not all
of it honorable.'56 However, in terms of influencing audience involvement,
these two clearly are meant to induce greater personal involvement with the
issue. By inviting the Justices to imagine how they would feel if they were
required to endure similar harassment, the rhetoric moves the audience from
an abstract level of involvement to a greater personal one. Although direct,
the rhetoric is carefully tempered in a number of ways. First, neither passage appears in a position of emphasis in the brief. Rather, one is buried in
the middle section and the other appears toward the end. 57 In terms of language, both examples use a generalized third-person term ("heterosexual
male") instead of speaking in the second person or about petitioner specifically. This syntax invites connection while simultaneously keeping a respectful distance. There is also considerable qualification and weakening
language and syntax in both examples.'58 All of these maneuvers serve the
156. First of all, the two examples only "work" to increase outcome involvement if
one presumes the audience is comprised of heterosexual males. The strategy certainly presumes a universality in the feelings of heterosexual men. Nevertheless, I believe that is
partly what petitioner was trying to do: he either did not think about the possibility of a nonheterosexual audience or aimed the strategy at only heterosexual men, presuming that they
comprised the majority of his audience. The two examples can also be read as an unfortunate play toward the presumed homophobia of the Supreme Court Justices. Nowhere in the
facts of petitioner's brief is it stated that petitioner Oncale is a married heterosexual man with
two children, but this is the implication of the two sentences. This oblique reference to Oncale's sexuality seems an attempt to "reassure" the Justices that the case is not about a homosexual who is harassed because of his homosexuality-the presumption being that such a
case would somehow be less egregious, or unworthy of serious attention. In part, the law of
Title VII would support such a homophobic strategy, in that it expressly does not cover discrimination against homosexuals. This peculiar disingenuous glitch in the law has spawned
some conflict in the federal circuits over whether the sexual orientation of a plaintiff could
potentially defeat a sexual harassment claim under Title VII. See e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d
563, 592-94 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
Perhaps more disturbingly, however, in an echo of Catharine MacKinnon's theory of
rape and female sexuality, the rhetoric also seems to imply that the conduct alleged would be
less injurious or demeaning to a gay man, who apparently could have conceivably welcomed
such behavior, whereas a heterosexual man would never welcome it. In this way, the strategy is also a "fear appeal," a persuasive strategy that can be very effective but, in some contexts, of dubious morality. Mark A. deTurck, PersuasiveEffects of Product WarningLabels,
in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 345, 347-48
(James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002); O'KEEFE, supra note 8, at 165-69. See
generally Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Shooting from the Lip: United States v.
Dickerson, Role [Im]morality,and the Ethics of Legal Rhetoric, 23 U. HAW. L. REv. 1 (2000)
(criticizing certain rhetorical strategies as unethical and immoral).
157. The first passage appears on pages 18-19 of Oncale's thirty-four-page brief, and
the second passage appears on pages 27-28. Oncale Petitioner's Brief, supra note 150, at
18-19, 27-28.
158. For example, the key sentence of the first example uses the qualifying filler "one
can assert with some confidence," a piece of linguistic flab that would ordinarily be cut to
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important function of making a direct appeal to judicial personal involvement appear less aggressive and direct, to the end of making the target audience more likely to process it centrally, and be less likely to boomerang.
Another interesting example of a subtle appeal to involvement appears
in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., which, like Oncale, was a Title VII sexual harassment case.'59 The primary issue in the case was whether a sexual
harassment plaintiff must prove severe psychological injury to prevail in a
hostile work environment case."6 At the heart of the case was the definition
of what is "abusive" in a work environment, and what a "reasonable person"
Twice in the plaintiff-petitioner's (Harris's) brief,
might find offensive.'
she notes that both the perpetrator of the harassment and an employee of
Forklift (the defendant-respondent) stated that they would be angered and
offended if men spoke to their wives or daughters the way the perpetrator
spoke to her.'62 As in the Oncale petitioner's brief, the point is not structurally highlighted, although it is mentioned twice; it is first raised in the middle of the "Statement of the Case," and then again in a footnote in the "Argument" section.'63
The argument seems directly pitched toward those men on the Supreme Court who have close familial relationships with women. For example, the footnote in the Argument section reads, "neither [defendant nor the
Forklift employee] would allow their wives to be subjected to the behavior
that [the defendant] imposed on [petitioner] at Forklift."'" Although the
increase the strength of the substantive statement. Id. at 18-19. The second reference is
phrased as a rhetorical question, a form less direct and confrontational than a bald statement.
It is also a form that increases the reader's interaction with the text, since most readers will
be inclined to answer the question.
159. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 17 (1993).
160. Id. at 20.
161. Id. at 21.
162. Brief of Petitioner at 6, 40 n.21, Harris, 510 U.S. 17 (No. 92-1168), 1993 WL
302216.
163. Id. The example in the statement of facts reads:
Both Mr. Hardy [the harasser] and David Thompson, a former Forklift employee, acknowledged the offensiveness of Mr. Hardy's behavior. Ms. Harris' undisputed testimony is that Mr. Hardy acknowledged that he would not like men to talk to his wife
or daughter the way he (Hardy) spoke to Ms. Harris. David Thompson acknowledged
that he wouldn't put up with a man talking to his wife in the sexually demeaning
manner that Mr. Hardy spoke to Ms. Harris.
Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
164. Id. at 40 n.21 (emphasis added). The use of "would allow" in this footnote is
quite interesting rhetorically. It is the reason I believe that the strategy-even when it speaks
of daughters and not wives-is pitched toward the male judges. The phrase calls up a patriarchal and somewhat primitive protective feeling associated with manhood. It also supports
the idea that this argument, at least in part, is pitched toward inducing greater personal involvement in the married Justices who are fathers of daughters, and is a subtle hypocrisy
induction. If the Justices agree that they "would not allow" someone to talk to their female
relatives in this way, how can they "allow" someone to talk to petitioner this way?
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testimony is of some relevance to the point that reasonable people can agree
about the offensiveness of the conduct in the case (even the perpetrator
agrees!), the relevance is tangential at best and was probably included for its
emotional power. But the argument also has the added benefit of ratcheting
up the level of outcome involvement of the Justices at whom it is directed
(married and/or fathers of daughters), moving them from a more abstract
value involvement toward a greater personal investment in the outcome of
the case.
The less direct methods of targeting outcome involvement are somewhat rarer in appellate briefs. To awaken a reader's perception of the connection between her experiences and the issues in the case, hypotheticals
and analogies represent the most effective options. An excellent example of
a tactic that succeeded in moving an audience from abstract value involvement (and a more superficial, "knee-jerk" process) to a more outcomerelevant involvement (and a more considered process) appears in an article
by Professor Joseph Singer. In the article, Professor Singer describes how
he persuaded his first-year property students to see both sides of a case
about plant closings.'65 In the case, a company that has operated in a town
for over fifty years decides to close a plant, in spite of the devastating impact this decision has on its employees and the town, both of whom had
come to rely on the company."
Most of Professor Singer's students saw the case from the corporation's perspective, and had difficulty understanding and articulating the
legal justifications for judicial intervention on behalf of the betrayed plant
employees. 67 Even the students sympathetic to the employees had difficulty explaining or arguing their position. Professor Singer tried any number of tactics to inspire deeper comprehension, including having students
read a law review article that laid out the arguments for judicial intervention
and pointing out the parts of the judicial opinions in which the judges described "in poignant rhetoric the painful dilemma the case presented."' 68
Both these methods failed to create deeper understanding on the part of the
students.
There are, of course, multiple potential reasons why the students remained "stuck" in their perspectives. But, in terms of their involvement, a
possible contributing reason is that the students felt only an abstract value
involvement and, consequently, processed the message peripherally. For
mostly middle-class students at law school, there were only abstract values
at stake, and no obvious connection to the issues in the case, so the students
processed the issue in a way that circumvented a deep consideration of ar165.
166.
167.
168.

Joseph Singer, Persuasion,87 MICH. L. REv. 2442, 2445 (1988).
Id. at 2445.
Id. at 2446-47.
Id. at 2447.
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gument merits. More superficial value involvement would, in part, explain
the failure to fully process substantive argument merits, as evidenced by the
pro-corporation students' inability to comprehend with any depth the arguments counter to their position. It would also explain the failure of the students sympathetic to the employees to have confidence in their position;
decisions reached through peripheral processes are usually held with shaky
confidence and are highly vulnerable to counterargument.
Finally, a value-involved process is also indicated by the failure of
central cues like the arguments in the law review article and the opinions to
induce any budge in attitude from the pro-corporation students. For those
students, who likely experienced a value-protective reaction to the plant
closing case, the strong merits arguments would serve only to stimulate
fervent counter-arguing. The students who experienced value affirmation
are a bit more of a mystery. As we would expect with value affirmation, the
pro-employee students did not change their position. But they also seemed
unable to defend their position, and it is unclear why Singer's merits arguments did not fortify their beliefs so that they held them with greater confidence. Part of this may be that even the students experiencing value affirmation did not have strongly held beliefs about the issues in the case; they
had value involvement, but it was not a very high level of involvement.
Another wrinkle is that Professor Singer also tried to convince the students by using a narrative, which the studies suggest would have the best
chance of inducing attitude change in a value-protective audience. Professor Singer describes telling a rich, detailed ("thick") narrative about the
situation of the plant workers.169 Nevertheless, by his account, the narrative
had no effect on either the value-protective or the value-affirmative students. It is possible that the students failed to respond to the anecdote because the story was simply too remote. Using a narrative about plant closings to convince an audience of law students is quite different from telling a
college student a story about the dangerous consequences of alcohol abuse
for a fellow student. It is easier for the college student to see the connection
between the story and his own experiences. Singer's students had a lesser
level of involvement in the plant closing case. so a story about a plant closing would not have great influence on their processing. Singer's experience
suggests that knowing that narrative "works" to persuade value-protective
message recipients is only a small piece of a larger puzzle; it begs the question of what kind of narrative works.170
169. Id. at 2447, 2455.
170. This explanation casts some significant doubt on the effectiveness of narrativebased advocacy, for example the "voices" brief in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
492 U.S. 490 (1989), even for value-protective audiences. It seems that it is still important to
stimulate something closer to outcome involvement. Interestingly, Singer's approach gives
some clues about how to do this.
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The tactic that eventually worked to inspire a deeper understanding for
Singer's students was an elaborate analogy that moved the students toward a
more connected "outcome" level of involvement. Singer gave the students
a hypothetical in which a law school radically changes its grading policy, in
the middle of the semester, to require failing grades for the bottom third of
the class. 7 ' The law school, much like the corporation in the plant closing
case, argues that it made no promises and should be permitted to run its
71
"business" of training lawyers as it sees fit, without judicial intervention.
This hypothetical worked a dramatic change in the class dynamic. The majority of students, who had been unable to see the validity of any arguments
other than corporate autonomy and freedom of contract, came to a greater
understanding of the compelling arguments based in reliance, unequal bargaining power, and fairness.'73
The plant closing hypothetical illustrates how an understanding of audience involvement can influence persuasive writing strategy. By using
analogy to move the students along the spectrum of involvement, away
from a more abstract "value-relevant" involvement and toward a more personal, concrete "outcome-relevant" involvement, Singer inspired students to
process the case in a deeper, more comprehensive way. As Singer noted,
the analogy did not inspire students to change their values; instead, it allowed them to see that the values at stake in the plant closing case were
values of high personal importance.'
The analogy moved the students to
process more centrally, which allowed them to understand and appreciate
more fully the merits of the case.'75
Although lawyers cannot translate Singer's strategy exactly into their
legal briefs, his success should inspire legal writers to use analogy to move
the audience toward greater outcome involvement. It also shows advocates
171.
Singer, supra note 165, at 2449.
172. Id. at2449-50.
173. Id. at 2450-56.
174. Professor Singer put it this way: the hypothetical was effective not because it
convinced the students to change their values, but because it made the students "aware of
values they already ha[d] which they simply had not initially thought were relevant." Id. at
2456 (emphasis removed). I would put it another way: prior to the hypothetical, the students
simply did not see their own stake in the issues of the case and they were not motivated to
strive for a deep understanding of the issues; instead, prior to the hypothetical, the students
were experiencing a "knee-jerk" response.
175. By changing the level of involvement, Professor Singer's more personalized
hypothetical also served as a subtle hypocrisy induction. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (explaining door-in-the-face reaction). Involvement is closely related to the
human propensity toward consistency and congruity. The students, consciously or subconsciously, realized at some point the inconsistency and hypocrisy of advocating one way for
themselves in the hypothetical context and against the workers in the plant closing case.
Professor Singer's analogy created dissonance; to resolve it, the students had to change either
their values or their decision.

Summer]

The Science of Persuasion

something about how to use narrative to get at a value-protective audience-as Singer surmises, a "thick" story, no matter how poignant and
evocative, may not be enough to move an audience. Rather, using analogy
(or an analogous or hypothetical narrative) to inspire readers to connect
more fully to an issue allows the advocate to have it both ways: it gives all
the arguments the power and resonance of a personal appeal, but sidesteps
most of the problems with a more direct appeal. Even if appellate lawyers
do not know details about the experiences of our audience, any number of
common human experiences can be grounds for an analogy: marital, sibling,
or parental relationships (as in Harris); friendships, education, cultural notions of masculinity and femininity (as in Oncale); and even law school.
Moreover, the analogy or hypothetical does not have to be as elaborate
as Singer's. Simply saying that the case is "akin to" or making a comparison that runs throughout the brief can be effective. Creative use of precedent is yet another way to make a connection between the issues in the case
and issues with greater "outcome" resonance for the audience. 76
The purpose of exploring the persuasive potential of involvement is
not to convince lawyers to make openly personalized arguments to appellate
judges, a strategy which would undoubtedly backfire. Rather, the purpose
of learning about involvement is to help advocates do more effectively what
they are already doing with motivational arguments. Lawyers attempt to
influence involvement all the time. They may not, however, always know
that the technique that seems "right" to them is really about involvement.
More important, they are not always using it in the most effective way. A
greater understanding of involvement and the ways to influence it are the
keys to using the techniques most effectively and skillfully. This means
understanding the different kinds of involvement and the persuasive power
of involvement, and understanding how to influence reader involvement in
ways that are powerful, yet ethical and acceptable to the audience.
CONCLUSION
In nersuasive lIfgl writing, audience is paramount. There is simplv no
such thing as "too much information" about the audience to whom a persuasive message is directed. Yet the concept of the legal audience has re176. A possible example of this is the common use of race and ethnic discrimination
cases as analogies in sex discrimination cases. Although this would represent a small
movement on the spectrum of involvement for white, male judges, it is possible that ethnic
and race discrimination would stimulate greater outcome involvement than examples based
on sex. See, e.g., Meritor Respondent's Brief, supra note 81, at 31 (responding to argument
that sexual harassers are "uniquely unlikely" to disclose their behavior by noting that "[a]
supervisor who requires only his Black employees to clean his personal residence is unlikely
to report it to the company") (citing Slack v. Havens, No. 72-59-GT, 1973 WL 339 (S.D.
Cal. 1973)); see also id. at 13 (comparing sexual epithets to racial and ethnic epithets).
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mained somewhat two-dimensional in the conventional wisdom. This twodimensionality is neither necessary nor advisable. There is a wealth of data
and theory outside law that can help flesh out the identity of the legal audience beyond the amorphous figure of the busy judge who is unfamiliar with
the facts and law of the case.' 77
This Article argues that information about the psychology of human
decisionmaking is one path to greater knowledge about the legal audience.
Sequential request strategies and audience involvement represent the first
steps in the process of using the information about human decisionmaking
to predict audience strategic preferences. Every small piece of information
helps to fill in another part of the picture of who that elusive legal audience
is and what makes her react.
The argument that information about human decisionmaking should
be incorporated into legal advocacy is not to say that the audience can be
defined exactly and accurately. Persuasive legal writing is, and remains, an
art, not a science. Nevertheless, science can be a part of art. The best persuasive legal writers already try to predict how their audiences will react to
certain arguments, syntax, analogies, or vocabulary. On the simplest level,
this Article argues that if you are going to do it, you should do it right. The
data about human decisionmaking will not give lawyers all the answers, but
it can show us strategies that we might never have known about or considered, and it can put a fresh spin on other, more familiar strategies.

177.
See, e.g., NEUMANN, supra note 24, at 317; BEAZLEY, supra note 10, at 3-4;
ALDISERT, supranote 6, at 18-19.

